Election of Remedies

有时，索赔人有一种以上的可能补救办法。无论是在他们可以辩护并证明多个诉讼原因的情况下，还是在他们只辩护并证明了一个诉讼原因的情况下，都是如此。在某些情况下，索赔人可以获得两种救济。例如，索赔人既可以因虚假陈述而解除合同，也可以因虚假陈述具有欺诈性而获得相应损失的损害赔偿（Newbigging v Adam, per Bowen）。在其他情况下，索赔人只能获得一个。例如，索赔人不能因违反有保证的合同前陈述而要求损害赔偿，也不能因该陈述的虚假而解除合同（Newbigging）。这些案例并没有系统地解释索赔人何时以及为什么必须在救济中选择的原则，而是（经常）依赖于模棱两可的“双重赔偿”。这一空白并没有被二手文献所填补：例如，令人惊讶的是，《麦格雷戈》中没有关于选举损害的章节。事实上，主要的理论解释来自于沃特森的一篇文章：核心主张是，索赔人必须选择补救措施，因为针对一个目标的一种补救措施可能间接实现另一个目标——在这种程度上，没有必要同时给予两种补救措施。然而，如果没有更多的发展，这种“过度补救积累”的论点并不能很好地解释这些案例。考虑两个例子。一方面，回到已经提到的案例，为什么损害赔偿和撤销有时是“过度补救积累”，有时不是？有人可能会认为，既然撤销权和损害赔偿权源于同一错误，这些补救措施应该间接实现对方的目标（Goldrei v Sinclair, per Bankes）。另一方面，为何剥夺利润的判罚和补偿性损害赔偿总是一种“过度的补救累积”（邓文士）？很难看出利润剥夺奖（并非因错误而产生）是如何间接实现对错误进行补偿的目的的（Birks）。这个哲学博士项目第一次试图系统地使补救措施的选择合理化。该方法是“解释性的”，因为该项目寻求产生一种最能解释法律的理论（在契合性、连贯性、可取性等方面）。该项目大致分为两部分。首先，当索赔人必须在多种救济中选择时（作为一个原则问题），将系统地进行调查：索赔人可以将赔偿和基于收益的裁决结合起来吗？解雇和基于收益的奖励？惩罚性损害赔偿和赔偿？等。其次，将讨论各种理论解释为什么索赔人必须选择。例如，一种可能性是，补救措施的选择是基于政策的：在欺诈性虚假陈述中，不需要通过选举来阻止欺诈。但是，鉴于法院不以这种方式推理，一个更好的（临时的）理论可能是，由每一种救济产生的次级补救权利取决于潜在的主要权利和义务。因此，可能的情况是，当多种补救办法可用时，没有一般原则可以解释。这个哲学博士项目之所以重要，并不仅仅是因为补救措施的选择在描述上和规范上都不确定——毕竟，大部分法律都是不确定的。这个地区“值得……因为在实践中，索赔人知道哪些补救措施是可用的以及为什么是至关重要的（巴罗斯）。用法与例句：“根据现行法律，潜在的诉讼当事人、他们的律师和法院没有令人满意的基础来决定补救措施之间的适当关系”（沃特森）。这是沃特森在2003年写这篇文章时的立场，而且（不可接受的是）到2023年仍然是这种立场。这个博士项目将彻底改变这一点。

Sometimes, claimants have available to them more than one possible remedy. This is true both where they can plead and prove multiple causes of action, as well as when they have pleaded and proved only one. In some cases, claimants can obtain both remedies. For example, a claimant is able both to rescind a contract for misrepresentation and obtain damages for consequential losses on the basis that the misrepresentation was fraudulent (Newbigging v Adam, per Bowen). In other cases, claimants can obtain only one. For example, a claimant cannot claim damages for a breach of a warranted pre-contractual representation as well as rescind the contract for the falsity of that representation (Newbigging).The cases have not systematically explained the principles behind when and why a claimant must elect between remedies - instead (often) relying on the equivocal phrase "double recovery". This gap has not been filled by the secondary literature: surprisingly, for instance, there is no chapter in McGregor on Damages on election. Indeed, the leading theoretical explanation comes in a single article by Watterson: the central claim being that claimants must choose remedies because one remedy, directed at one aim, may indirectly achieve the aims of another - it is unnecessary to award both to that extent. Yet, without more development, this "excessive remedial cumulation" thesis does not neatly explain the cases. Consider two examples. Returning, on the one hand, to the cases already mentioned, why are damages and rescission sometimes an "excessive remedial cumulation" and sometimes not? One might think that since the right to rescind and the right to damages arise from the same wrong these remedies should indirectly achieve the aims of the other (Goldrei v Sinclair, per Bankes). Why, on the other hand, are profit-stripping awards and compensatory damages always an "excessive remedial cumulation" (Tang Man Sit)? It is difficult to see how profit-stripping awards (which do not arise for a wrong) indirectly achieve the aims of compensation for a wrong (Birks).This DPhil project seeks to rationalise the election of remedies systematically for the first time. The methodology is "interpretative" in that the project seeks to produce a theory that best explains the law (in terms of fit, coherence, desirability, etc). The project will broadly be structured in two parts. First, it will systematically be investigated when (as a matter of doctrine) the claimant must elect between multiple remedies: can a claimant combine compensation and gain-based awards? Rescission and gain-based awards? Exemplary damages and compensation? Etc. Second, various theoretical explanations as to why the claimant must elect will then be discussed. One possibility, for example, is that election of remedies is grounded on policy: no election is required in fraudulent misrepresentation to discourage fraud. But, given that the courts do not reason in this way, a better (provisional) theory might be that the secondary remedial rights arising from each remedy depend on the underlying primary rights and duties. It may, therefore, be the case that there is no general principle explaining when multiple remedies are available. This DPhil project is not important just because the election of remedies is descriptively and normatively uncertain - after all, much of the law is. This area "deserves...attention" because it is vital in practice that claimants know which remedies are available and why (Burrows). "As the law stands, potential litigants, their lawyers, and courts have no satisfactory basis on which to decide the proper relationship between the remedies" (Watterson). That was the position when Watterson wrote his article in 2003 and (unacceptably) it remains the position in 2023. This DPhil project will comprehensively change that.