Posted prices, bargaining and auctions: an experimental examination

这个项目使用经济学方法来研究交易机构如何影响价格和效率。它通过定向搜索来检查市场：买家根据卖家掌握的任何信息访问卖家。同时的买家选择和卖家的能力限制导致“摩擦”，即并非所有有利可图的交易都会发生--这比通常的“无摩擦”假设更现实。这个项目将有所不同：卖家是否可以提前公布价格；以及是否以及如何根据有多少买家(一对两或更多)拜访卖家进行谈判。该项目将使用拍卖、讨价还价、博弈论和搜索理论以及新的分析结果来形成预测，并将通过实验进行测试。这一结果应该会对劳工和竞争政策产生影响。

This project uses economic methods to investigate how trading institutions affect prices and efficiency. It examines markets with directed search: buyers visit sellers based on any information they have. Simultaneous buyer choices and sellers’ capacity constraints lead to “frictions” where not all profitable exchanges occur - more realistic than the usual “frictionless” assumption. The project will vary: whether sellers can post prices in advance; and, whether and how negotiation occurs based on how many buyers (one vs two or more) visit a seller. The project will use results from auction, bargaining, game and search theories, and new analysis, to form predictions, which will be tested using experiments. The results should have implications for labour and competition policies.