"Dissociating belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recall within autobiographical memory: Conceptual refinement and experimental manipulation"

很多时候，回忆事件和相信过去发生的事件是一起发生的。记忆通常是被相信的，自传体回忆的研究通常是对被相信的记忆的研究。然而，最近的研究表明，自传体信仰可以在没有回忆的情况下发生。对错误记忆和不记得的自传体事件的研究表明，自传体信念经常发生在缺乏记忆的情况下。对不被相信的记忆，即以前被相信但不再被相信的记忆的研究表明，回忆也可以超越信念。其他理论和研究表明，回忆和对回忆准确性的信念（通过信心）在概念上也是不同的。然而，相信发生，回忆，回忆的信心，还没有在理论上和经验上同时区分。该研究计划将：1）测试结构模型，其中对发生的信念，回忆和回忆的信心被理论化，以代表不同的潜在变量，使用适当的事件提示方法; 2）在实验室中实验性地创建和操纵不相信的记忆; 3）进行第一次探索性神经成像研究，区分发生信念和回忆。累积起来，这些研究将建立在何种程度上区分信念的发生，回忆和信心的reollection挑战以前的概念化的结构和功能的自传体记忆。研究中的这些过程之间的分离可能会导致人们对当人们表示他们正在回忆时究竟报告了什么的理论进行修正。如果通过这项研究提出的解离出现，那么现有的记忆方法可能需要修改，以适应对事件发生的真实性的评估与记忆样心理模拟的存在之间的区别，这种心理模拟可能会也可能不会指示过去发生的事件。

Much of the time, recollecting events and believing that events occurred in the past happen together. Memories are typically believed, and the study of autobiographical recollection is often the study of believed memories. Yet recent work shows that autobiographical belief can occur without recollection. Work on false memories and non-remembered autobiographical events shows that autobiographical beliefs frequently occur in the absence of memory. Research on non-believed memories, memories that were formerly but are no longer believed, shows that recollection can also exceed belief. Other theory and research shows that recollection and belief in the accuracy of recall (via confidence) are also conceptually distinct. However, belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recall have yet to be theoretically and empirically distinguished simultaneously. This research program will, 1) test structural models in which belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recollection are theorized to represent distinct latent variables, using appropriate event cueing methods that are developed; 2) experimentally create and manipulate non-believed memories in the laboratory; and 3) conduct the first exploratory neuroimaging study of the distinction between belief in occurrence and recollection. Cumulatively, these studies will establish the degree to which distinguishing belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in reollection challenges previous conceptualizations of the structure and function of autobiographical memory. Dissociations between processes such as those under investigation may lead to revisions of theories about exactly what is being reported when people indicated that they are remembering. Should the proposed dissociations emerge through this research, established approaches to memory may require revision in order to accommodate the distinction between evaluations of the truth of event occurrence versus the presence of memory-like mental simulations that may or may not indiate events happened in the past.