"Dissociating belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recall within autobiographical memory: Conceptual refinement and experimental manipulation"

很多时候，回忆事件和相信过去发生的事件是一起发生的。记忆通常是相信的，对自传式回忆的研究通常是对相信的记忆的研究。然而，最近的研究表明，自传式信念可以在没有回忆的情况下产生。对错误记忆和不记得的自传式事件的研究表明，自传式信念经常发生在没有记忆的情况下。对不被相信的记忆的研究表明，回忆也可以超越信念。这些记忆以前是被相信的，但现在不再被相信。其他理论和研究表明，回忆和相信回忆的准确性（通过信心）在概念上也是不同的。然而，对发生的信念、回忆和对回忆的信心在理论上和经验上尚未同时得到区分。本研究计划将：1)测试结构模型，在这些模型中，对发生的信念、回忆和回忆的信心被理论化，以表示不同的潜在变量，使用适当的事件线索方法；2)在实验室中实验性地创造和操纵不相信的记忆；3)首次对发生信念与回忆信念的区别进行探索性神经影像学研究。累积起来，这些研究将确定对发生、回忆和回忆信心的区分信念在多大程度上挑战了之前对自传体记忆结构和功能的概念化。这些被调查的过程之间的分离可能会导致理论的修正，即当人们表示他们正在记忆时，究竟报告了什么。如果通过这项研究提出的分离，既定的记忆方法可能需要修改，以适应事件发生真相的评估与可能或可能不表明过去发生的事件的记忆类心理模拟的存在之间的区别。

Much of the time, recollecting events and believing that events occurred in the past happen together. Memories are typically believed, and the study of autobiographical recollection is often the study of believed memories. Yet recent work shows that autobiographical belief can occur without recollection. Work on false memories and non-remembered autobiographical events shows that autobiographical beliefs frequently occur in the absence of memory. Research on non-believed memories, memories that were formerly but are no longer believed, shows that recollection can also exceed belief. Other theory and research shows that recollection and belief in the accuracy of recall (via confidence) are also conceptually distinct. However, belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recall have yet to be theoretically and empirically distinguished simultaneously. This research program will, 1) test structural models in which belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recollection are theorized to represent distinct latent variables, using appropriate event cueing methods that are developed; 2) experimentally create and manipulate non-believed memories in the laboratory; and 3) conduct the first exploratory neuroimaging study of the distinction between belief in occurrence and recollection. Cumulatively, these studies will establish the degree to which distinguishing belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in reollection challenges previous conceptualizations of the structure and function of autobiographical memory. Dissociations between processes such as those under investigation may lead to revisions of theories about exactly what is being reported when people indicated that they are remembering. Should the proposed dissociations emerge through this research, established approaches to memory may require revision in order to accommodate the distinction between evaluations of the truth of event occurrence versus the presence of memory-like mental simulations that may or may not indiate events happened in the past.