Metaphorical Influences on Time Perception

在这段时间里，我的目标是追求一个研究项目，旨在阐明控制人类时间感知的原则。这个目标是一个更大、更长期的目标的一部分，这个目标是阐明人们如何通过对感官输入的理解强加结构来构建现实的各个方面的过程。我之前的研究提供了一个调查的来源错误的感知的空间位置，以及持续时间和强度的听觉和视觉事件。例如，Alards-Tomalin，Leboe-McGowan，Shaw和Leboe-McGowan（2014）证明了数量大小，大小和颜色饱和度的相似性会使时间感知发生偏差，因此，在这些维度上大小相似的标记两侧的间隔被认为比在大小上完全不同的标记两侧的间隔持续时间更短。也就是说，间隔标记的相似性影响了对时间的感知，而与实际持续时间无关。我们通过应用沃尔什（2003）的数量理论（ATOM）解释了这些结果。根据这种方法，幅度相似性扭曲感知持续时间，因为各种尺寸的幅度处理发生在一个通用的幅度处理系统内的顶内沟区域的大脑。然而，这种解释存在一些问题，我在以前的研究中发现了其中一些问题（Alards-Tomalin，步行者，Kravetz，& Leboe-McGowan，2016; Alards-Tomalin，步行者，Nepon，& Leboe-McGowan，2017）。作为一种替代的原子方法，我提出了一个研究计划，探讨如何启发式推理，基于相似性的分组过程的指导下，帮助指导我们的心理建设的时间的推移。具体来说，我建议通过创建间隔标记，结合联合收割机不同的基础相似性，以测试这种分组过程的贡献。这些将包括基于物理（重叠刺激特征）和基于意义的刺激特征（语义相关性）的相似性，以及由任务需求生成的刺激独立特征（即，响应于相同或不同的刺激执行相同的任务）。具有特殊理论意义的是不依赖于量级的相似性维度。ATOM方法无法解释相似性对事件持续时间判断的影响。这种方法只能解释由对其他大小维度（如大小和强度）的感知引起的时间感知扭曲。因此，我的研究旨在解决一个重要的理论问题，即事件的不相关特征是否会通过基于原子的干扰量级维度的过程或更广泛的物理学影响（即，简单的决策规则），我们用来推断和构建我们与外部世界的瞬间体验的性质。

In this grant period, my goal is to pursue a program of study aimed at clarifying the principles that control human time perception. This goal is part of a larger, longer-term goal to illuminate the processes that underlie how people construct the various aspects of their reality by imposing structure on their apprehension of sensory inputs. My prior research provided an investigation of sources of error in the perception of the spatial location, and the duration and intensity of auditory and visual events. For example, Alards-Tomalin, Leboe-McGowan, Shaw, & Leboe-McGowan (2014) demonstrated that similarity in number magnitude, size, and colour saturation biases the perception of time, such that intervals that are flanked by markers that are similar in magnitude on these dimensions are perceived as shorter in duration than intervals that are flanked by markers that are quite different in magnitude. That is, the similarity of the interval markers influenced the perception of time, independent of the actual duration. We have interpreted these results through an application of Walsh's (2003) A Theory of Magnitude (ATOM). According to this approach, magnitude similarity distorts perceived duration because the processing of magnitude for a variety of dimensions occurs within a general-purpose magnitude processing system in the intraparietal sulcus region of the brain. However, there are some problems with this interpretation, and I have identified some of these in my previous research (Alards-Tomalin, Walker, Kravetz, & Leboe-McGowan, 2016; Alards-Tomalin, Walker, Nepon, & Leboe-McGowan, 2017). As an alternative to an ATOM approach, I propose a program of research to investigate how heuristic inferences, guided by similarity-based grouping processes, help to guide our mental construction of the passage of time. Specifically, I propose to test the contribution of such grouping processes by creating interval markers that combine different bases of similarity. These will include similarity based on physical (overlapping stimulus features) and meaning-based stimulus features (semantic relatedness), as well as stimulus-independent features generated by task demands (i.e., performing the same task in response to the same or different stimuli). Of particular theoretical relevance are dimensions of similarity that are not magnitude dependent. An ATOM approach cannot explain such influences of similarity on judgments of event duration. That approach can only explain distortions of time perception caused by perception of other magnitude dimensions, such as size and intensity. Consequently, my research aims to resolve the important theoretical question of whether irrelevant features of events bias the perception of time through an ATOM-based process of interfering magnitude dimensions or a broader influence of heuristics (i.e., simple decision rules) that we use to infer and construct the nature of our moment-to-moment experiences with the external world.