Power Structure Dynamics in Growing Multilateral Development Banks: The Case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
Power Structure Dynamics in Growing Multilateral Development Banks: The Case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
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不断壮大的多边开发银行的权力结构动态：亚洲基础设施投资银行的案例
DOI：
10.1111/1758-5899.12893
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发表时间：
2021-02
期刊：
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Kourosh Houshm
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hang Luo;Lize Yang;Kourosh Houshm
作为第一家由中国发起设立的多边开发银行，亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行）发展迅速，成立不到三年，已成为仅次于世界银行的第二大多边开发银行。在超级计算机（未名-1）的辅助下，结合生成函数的方法，我们精确测量了亚投行每个成员的投票权（首次针对拥有80多个成员和超过100万张分发选票的组织进行分析）。我们发现，除中国以外的许多成员国在重大问题上拥有过大的阻止行动的权力，但它们发起行动的权力相当有限，而且分布得很紧密。此外，与程序问题相比，亚投行的权力结构在实质性问题上相对公平或“民主”。更有趣的是，我们分析了中国、印度、俄罗斯、德国、英国和法国等主要成员国在新成员加入后的投票权动态。虽然所有现有成员的投票权权重单调地按比例下降，但有些成员的投票权在某些情况下甚至增加。我们发现，投票规则的要求，以及新成员和现有成员的规模，都影响成员的权力演变。最后，我们衡量了亚投行作为一个整体的权力平衡和决策效率，并讨论了它们之间的关系。我们的分析旨在为日益增长的多边开发银行提供投票权重分配，投票规则设计以及重要的成员扩展选择的见解。
As the first multilateral development bank (MDB) initiated by China, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has been growing rapidly, and within three years of its establishment, has become the second largest multilateral development bank after the World Bank. With the assistance of the supercomputer (Weiming‐1) and combing the method of generating functions, we measured precisely the voting power of each member of the AIIB (analysis which has been done for the first time for an organization with more than 80 members and more than 1 million distributed votes). We find that a host of member countries other than China have outsized power to prevent action on significant matters, but their power to initiate action are quite modest and closely distributed. Furthermore, the power structures in the AIIB are relatively even or ‘democratic’ on substantive matters when compared to procedural matters. More interestingly, we analyzed the dynamics of voting power of major members like China, India, Russia, Germany, the UK and France with the admission of new members. While the voting weights of all existing members decreased monotonously and proportionally, the voting power of some members in some cases even increased. We find that the requirements of voting rules, and the size of new and existing members, all affect how members’ power evolve. Lastly, we measured the balance of power and the decision‐making efficiency of the AIIB as a whole organization beyond individual members and discussed relationships between them. Our analysis aims to provide insights into the allocation of voting weights, the design of voting rules and importantly, the choice of membership expansions for growing multilateral development banks.
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影响因子：
1.3
作者：
J. Strand
通讯作者：
J. Strand
影响因子：
5.3
作者：
F. Aleskerov;Gamze Avcı;Viatcheslav Iakouba;Z. U. Türem
通讯作者：
F. Aleskerov;Gamze Avcı;Viatcheslav Iakouba;Z. U. Türem
DOI：
10.1163/19426720-02201002
发表时间：
2016-02
期刊：
Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations
影响因子：
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作者：
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通讯作者：
G. Chin
影响因子：
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作者：
W. J. Dixon
通讯作者：
W. J. Dixon
DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.49.6.831.16024
发表时间：
2003-06
期刊：
Manag. Sci.
影响因子：
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作者：
D. Leech
通讯作者：
D. Leech