Inoculating science against potential pandemics and information hazards.
Inoculating science against potential pandemics and information hazards.
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DOI:
10.1371/journal.ppat.1007286
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发表时间:
2018-10
期刊:
影响因子:
6.7
通讯作者:
Esvelt KM
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Esvelt KM
The recent de novo assembly of horsepox is an instructive example of an information hazard: published methods enabling poxvirus synthesis led to media coverage spelling out the implications, efficiently disseminating true information that might be used to cause harm. Whether or not the benefits justified the risks, the horsepox saga provides ample reason to upgrade the current system for screening synthesized DNA for hazardous sequences, which does not cover the majority of firms and cannot reliably prevent the assembly of potentially pandemic pathogens. An upgraded system might leverage one-way encryption to confidentially scrutinize virtually all commercial production by a cooperative international network of servers whose integrity can be verified by third parties. Funders could support participating institutions to ease the transition or outright subsidize the market to make clean DNA cheaper, while boycotts by journals, institutions, and funders could ensure compliance and require hardware-level locks on future DNA synthesizers. However, the underlying problem is that security and safety discussions among experts typically follow potentially hazardous events rather than anticipating them. Changing norms and incentives to favor preregistration and advisory peer review of planned experiments could test alternatives to the current closeted research model in select areas of science. Because the fields of synthetic mammalian virology and especially gene drive research involve technologies that could be unilaterally deployed and may self-replicate in the wild, they are compelling candidates for initial trials of early-stage peer review.
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影响因子:
3.7
作者:
Noyce RS;Lederman S;Evans DH
通讯作者:
Evans DH
DOI:
10.1089/bsp.2013.0047
发表时间:
2013-09-01
期刊:
BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM-BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRACTICE AND SCIENCE
影响因子:
--
作者:
Sell, Tara Kirk;Watson, Matthew
通讯作者:
Watson, Matthew
影响因子:
1.9
作者:
Bostrom, Nick
通讯作者:
Bostrom, Nick
DOI:
10.1126/science.1249252
发表时间:
2014-04-04
期刊:
Science (New York, N.Y.)
影响因子:
--
作者:
Annaluru N;Muller H;Mitchell LA;Ramalingam S;Stracquadanio G;Richardson SM;Dymond JS;Kuang Z;Scheifele LZ;Cooper EM;Cai Y;Zeller K;Agmon N;Han JS;Hadjithomas M;Tullman J;Caravelli K;Cirelli K;Guo Z;London V;Yeluru A;Murugan S;Kandavelou K;Agier N;Fischer G;Yang K;Martin JA;Bilgel M;Bohutski P;Boulier KM;Capaldo BJ;Chang J;Charoen K;Choi WJ;Deng P;DiCarlo JE;Doong J;Dunn J;Feinberg JI;Fernandez C;Floria CE;Gladowski D;Hadidi P;Ishizuka I;Jabbari J;Lau CY;Lee PA;Li S;Lin D;Linder ME;Ling J;Liu J;Liu J;London M;Ma H;Mao J;McDade JE;McMillan A;Moore AM;Oh WC;Ouyang Y;Patel R;Paul M;Paulsen LC;Qiu J;Rhee A;Rubashkin MG;Soh IY;Sotuyo NE;Srinivas V;Suarez A;Wong A;Wong R;Xie WR;Xu Y;Yu AT;Koszul R;Bader JS;Boeke JD;Chandrasegaran S
通讯作者:
Chandrasegaran S
影响因子:
3.3
作者:
DiEuliis, Diane;Berger, Kavita;Gronvall, Gigi
通讯作者:
Gronvall, Gigi