Politicisation, business lobbying, and the design of preferential trade agreements

Politicisation, business lobbying, and the design of preferential trade agreements
复制标题

政治化、商业游说和优惠贸易协定的设计

DOI:
10.1080/13501763.2023.2218413
复制
发表时间:
2023
影响因子:
4.2
通讯作者:
Antoine E
Antoine E
中科院分区:
管理学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Antoine E

文献摘要

参考文献

被引文献

相似文献

我们的论文解决了政府如何应对优惠贸易协定(PTA)政治化的问题。在谈判贸易协定时,各国政府是如何应对商业利益动员的?此外,如果一项贸易协定的重要性有所提高,这是否改变了政府的反应?首先,我们根据在优惠贸易区谈判期间私营部门利益的动员模式来评估政治化。我们的核心论点是,当涉及众多行业的广泛商业利益动员起来响应贸易谈判时,政府的自由化程度会更高,因为这将为它们的政策立场提供合法性。其次,我们研究了各国政府对当前贸易协定显著程度的反应。我们认为,当有争议的协议非常突出并引发越来越多的公众辩论时,政府的自由化程度会降低。我们采用以行为者为中心的比较方法来解决我们的研究问题,并使用了涵盖2005年至2018年期间的157个pta的新数据集。我们的分析支持了我们的两个假设。我们的研究结果还揭示了PTA“深度”和“刚性”之间的重要差异,这两者通常被认为在评估贸易开放程度时密切相关。
Our paper addresses the question of how governments respond to the politicisation of preferential trade agreements (PTA). How have governments responded to business interest mobilisation while negotiating PTAs? Moreover, if there has been an increase in the salience of a trade agreement, has this changed the government response? First, we assess politicisation in terms of the mobilisation patterns of private sector interests during PTA negotiations. Our central argument is that governments liberalise more when a broad range of business interests involving a large number of sectors mobilise in response to trade negotiations, as this would provide legitimacy to their policy positions. Second, we study governments’ reactions to the level of salience of the trade agreement at hand. We argue that governments liberalise less when the agreement in question is highly salient and provokes increased public debate. We take an actor-centred and comparative approach to our research questions and use a novel dataset of 157 PTAs covering the period from 2005 to 2018. Both of our hypotheses are supported by our analysis. Our results also reveal an important difference between PTA ‘depth’ and ‘rigidity’, which are often perceived as closely correlated in assessing trade openness.
保护自由贸易:原产地规则的政治经济学
DOI: --
发表时间: 2008
影响因子: 7.8
作者:
Kerry A. Chase
通讯作者: Kerry A. Chase
英国的利益集团动员和游说模式:报纸分析
DOI: 10.1057/iga.2012.2
发表时间: 2012
影响因子: 0.8
作者:
Bernhagen P
通讯作者: Bernhagen P
DOI: 10.1057/s41309-022-00174-z
发表时间: 2022-11-12
影响因子: 0.8
作者:
Duer, Andreas;Huber, Robert A.;Spilker, Gabriele
通讯作者: Spilker, Gabriele
异质贸易协定、世贸组织成员资格和国际贸易:使用匹配计量经济学进行分析
DOI: --
发表时间: 2015
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者:
Tristan Kohl;Sofia Trojanowska
通讯作者: Sofia Trojanowska
“全球价值链世界”中的贸易政策:跨国公司和贸易自由化
DOI: --
发表时间: 2020
影响因子: 1.8
作者:
Christina Anderer;Andreas Dür;Lisa Lechner
通讯作者: Lisa Lechner