Dual-channel supply chain decisions under asymmetric information with a risk-averse retailer

Dual-channel supply chain decisions under asymmetric information with a risk-averse retailer
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非对称信息下零售商规避风险的双渠道供应链决策

DOI:
10.1007/s10479-015-1852-2
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发表时间:
2017-10
影响因子:
4.8
通讯作者:
Hou Pengwen
Hou Pengwen
中科院分区:
管理学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Li Qinghua;Li Bo;Chen Ping;Hou Pengwen

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许多上游品牌商建立了与零售商的直接沟通渠道,这是制造商的侵占行为。本文将零售商的风险规避行为引入到非对称信息下的制造商侵占问题中,着重研究了零售商的风险规避行为和制造商的单位销售成本对最优决策的影响。为了解决这个问题,我们假设市场需求可能高或低,每种需求都遵循截断正态分布。零售商比制造商有更多的关于市场规模的信息。在均值-方差决策框架下,建立了一个双渠道供应链模型,得到了最优均衡结果的三个可行域。我们发现,制造商的利润和零售商的效用是好还是坏取决于制造商的单位销售成本和零售商的风险规避程度。数值实验比较了信息不对称和信息对称情况下供应链双方的期望利润和效用。
Manyupstreambrandmanufacturershaveestablishedtheirdirectchannelstocom-.pete with the retailers; this is encroachment behavior by the manufacturers. In this paper, we.introduce the retailer’s risk-averse behavior into the manufacturer’s encroachment problem.under asymmetric information, focusing specifically on how the risk-averse behavior of the.retailer and the per-unit selling cost of the manufacturer influence the optimal decisions. To.addressthisproblem,weassumethatthemarketdemandmaybehighorlow,andeachkindof.demand follows a truncated normal distribution. The retailer has more information regarding.the market size than the manufacturer. Under the mean–variance decision framework, we.develop a dual-channel supply chain model and obtain three feasible regions of the optimal.equilibrium results. We find that whether the profit of the manufacturer and the utility of the.retailer are better off or worse off depends on the manufacturer’s per-unit selling cost and.the degree of risk aversion of the retailer. Numerical experiments provide the comparisons of.the expected profits and the utilities of both members in the supply chain under asymmetric.information and symmetric information.
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发表时间: 2015-10
影响因子: 4.8
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期刊: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
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DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2018432
发表时间: 2012-03
期刊: ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)
影响因子: --
作者:
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