Game analysis of carbon emission verification: A case study from Shenzhen's cap-and-trade system in China

Game analysis of carbon emission verification: A case study from Shenzhen's cap-and-trade system in China
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碳排放核查的博弈分析:以深圳总量控制与交易体系为例

DOI:
10.1016/j.enpol.2019.04.024
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发表时间:
2019-07
期刊:
影响因子:
9
通讯作者:
Xiong Yi
Xiong Yi
中科院分区:
经济学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Pan Yanchun;Yang Wen;Ma Nan;Chen Zhimin;Zhou Ming;Xiong Yi

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碳排放核查是妥善实施总量管制与交易制度所需的关键因素之一。然而,为了获得更多的收入,排放产生公司(GC)可能与第三方验证者(3个PV)勾结,隐瞒真实的碳排放数据。本文结合深圳市交通运输系统的实际情况,构建了一个三人博弈模型,分析了政府、政府、政府三方的行为。考虑到政府目前的分段线性再验证政策,已提供了GC的最佳报告碳强度。研究表明,如果实际碳强度大于历史碳强度,GC可能会报告更少的碳强度,并隐瞒实际碳排放量。针对这一问题,提出了一种新的指数重验证策略。基于深圳市碳排放系统的真实数据,实验结果表明,政府在选择温室气体再核查时,应更多地关注工业产品增加值(IVA)下降的温室气体,而不是碳排放量较高的温室气体。实验还表明,当初始重新验证概率设定在一定范围内时,新策略在总隐藏碳排放量和总重新验证成本上均优于现行策略。
Carbon emission verification is one of the key factors required for proper implementation of a cap-and-trade (C&T) system. However, to obtain more revenue, emission generating companies (GCs) may collude with third-party verifiers (3 PVs) and conceal real carbon emission data. Based on actual practice of Shenzhen's C&T system, a three-player game model has been devised in this paper to analyze the behaviors among GCs, 3 PVs and government. Given the government's current piecewise linear re-verification policy, the optimal reported carbon intensity for GCs has been provided. Our research reveals that if the actual carbon intensity is larger than historical carbon intensity GCs may report less carbon intensity and conceal actual carbon emission. To deal with this issue, a new exponential re-verification policy is proposed. Based on authentic data from Shenzhen's C&T system, the experimental results show that the government should devote more attention to GCs with a decreasing industrial product output value-added (IVA) than to those with high carbon emissions when selecting GCs for re-verification. Our experiments also illustrate that the new policy outperforms the current one on both total concealed amount of carbon emission and total re-verification cost if the initial re-verification probability is set within a specific range.
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