Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions

Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions
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收入上限的高效拍卖

DOI:
10.1093/jeea/jvz015
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发表时间:
2019
影响因子:
3.6
通讯作者:
Yamashita Takuro
Yamashita Takuro
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Muto Nozomu;Shirata Yasuhiro;Yamashita Takuro

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我们研究一个拍卖,最大化的预期社会盈余下的上限约束卖方的预期收入,我们称之为arevenue上限。例如,当(i)拍卖设计者是“亲买方”的,也就是说,他最大化买方和卖方的拍卖收益的加权和,其中买方的权重大于卖方的权重;(ii)拍卖设计师最大限度地提高(未加权)总盈余在多单位拍卖中,卖方拥有的单位数量是私人信息;或(iii)多个卖方竞争,以吸引买家在拍卖前。我们描述的机制约束有效的拍卖,并确定其重要属性。首先,卖方不设底价,确定出售货物。第二,在收入上限不小的情况下,“捆绑”是必要的。最后,在一个足够严格的收入上限,约束有效拍卖有abid上限,使聚束至少发生在“顶部”,也就是说,“没有扭曲的顶部”失败。
We study an auction that maximizes the expected social surplus under an upper-bound constraint on the seller’s expected revenue, which we call arevenue cap. Such a constrained-efficient auction may arise, for example, when (i) the auction designer is “pro-buyer”, that is, he maximizes the weighted sum of the buyers’ and seller’s auction payoffs, where the weight for the buyers is greater than that for the seller; (ii) the auction designer maximizes the (unweighted) total surplus in a multiunit auction in which the number of units the seller owns is private information; or (iii) multiple sellers compete to attract buyers before the auction. We characterize the mechanisms for constrained-efficient auctions and identify their important properties. First, the seller sets no reserve price and sells the good for sure. Second, with a nontrivial revenue cap, “bunching” is necessary. Finally, with a sufficiently severe revenue cap, the constrained-efficient auction has abid cap, so that bunching occurs at least “at the top,” that is, “no distortion at the top” fails.
关于彼得斯和塞韦里诺夫的注释,“提供拍卖而不是价格的卖家之间的竞争”
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