Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions
Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions
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收入上限的高效拍卖
DOI:
10.1093/jeea/jvz015
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发表时间:
2019
影响因子:
3.6
通讯作者:
Yamashita Takuro
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Muto Nozomu;Shirata Yasuhiro;Yamashita Takuro
We study an auction that maximizes the expected social surplus under an upper-bound constraint on the seller’s expected revenue, which we call arevenue cap. Such a constrained-efficient auction may arise, for example, when (i) the auction designer is “pro-buyer”, that is, he maximizes the weighted sum of the buyers’ and seller’s auction payoffs, where the weight for the buyers is greater than that for the seller; (ii) the auction designer maximizes the (unweighted) total surplus in a multiunit auction in which the number of units the seller owns is private information; or (iii) multiple sellers compete to attract buyers before the auction. We characterize the mechanisms for constrained-efficient auctions and identify their important properties. First, the seller sets no reserve price and sells the good for sure. Second, with a nontrivial revenue cap, “bunching” is necessary. Finally, with a sufficiently severe revenue cap, the constrained-efficient auction has abid cap, so that bunching occurs at least “at the top,” that is, “no distortion at the top” fails.
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