Tacit Bargaining and Tacit Cooperation in Arms Control

军控领域的默契谈判与默契合作

• 批准号: 8708271
• 负责人: George Downs
• 金额: $ 5.99万
• 依托单位: University of California-Davis
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-08-15 至 1989-10-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8708271&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Tacit; Bargaining; Cooperation; Arms; Control

A state tacitly bargains with another state when it attempts to manipulate the latter's policy choices through its behavior rather than by relying on formal or informal diplomatic exchanges. The process is tacit because actions rather than rhetoric constitute the critical medium of communication; it is bargaining and not coercion because the actions are aimed at influencing an outcome that can only be achieved through some measure of joint voluntary behavior. In the past few years, the slow progress and modest achievements of formal negotiations have prompted speculation about the potential of tacit bargaining as an alternative mechanism for promoting arms control. It has been argued, for example, that the reduction of nuclear weapons can be most effectively pursued by way of unilateral or reciprocal restraint (e.g., slowing the deployment of new weapons) outside the context of negotiations. This project evaluates the capacity of specific tacit bargaining strategies to stabilize or reduce arms races. Formal analysis and simulation are used to explore the ability of these strategies to cope with uncertainty about the motives of the rival state, bluffing, misinterpretation, the time-preference of decision makers, and a multiplicity of response options. Despite the complexity created by the simultaneous operation of these factors, recent work in this area suggests that certain generalizations will emerge that can aid a nation in deciding how to conduct tacit bargaining as well as to help social scientists understand tacit bargaining as an alternative mechanism for promoting arms control.

当一个国家试图与另一个国家讨价还价时， 通过其行为操纵后者的政策选择， 而不是依靠正式或非正式的外交交流。 的 过程是默认的，因为行动而不是修辞构成了 沟通的关键媒介;它是讨价还价，而不是胁迫 因为这些行动的目的是影响结果， 通过一些共同的自愿行为来实现。 在 在过去几年中，正规教育进展缓慢，成绩不佳， 谈判促使人们猜测， 谈判作为促进军备控制的替代机制。 它 例如，有人认为，削减核武器 可以通过单边或对等的方式最有效地实现 约束（例如，（一）新武器的部署（ 谈判的背景。 本项目对具体的默契谈判能力进行了评估 稳定或减少军备竞赛。 形式化分析与 模拟用于探索这些策略的能力， 科普敌对国家动机的不确定性，虚张声势， 误解，决策者的时间偏好，以及 多种应对方案。 尽管复杂性 这些因素同时作用，这方面的最新工作 表明，某些概括将出现，可以帮助一个 国家在决定如何进行默许谈判以及帮助 社会科学家认为，作为一种替代方案， 促进军备控制的机制。