Firms' Choice of Method of Determining Pay: Evidence from the Industry Wage Surveys

监督工人的表现是一项昂贵而困难的工作， 许多公司的程序，因此，有关工人的信息 生产力往往是不完美的。 虽然这一事实是公平的 很明显，这对工人们 补偿不是。 因为补偿计划可能会产生巨大的影响 对工人生产力的影响，工人薪酬的影响 安排一直是劳动经济学的一个重要主题， 一般经济理论。 雇主监控工人和使用他们所做的事情的程度 在确定工资方面从监测中学习是一个主题， 从多个理论角度进行探讨。 其中的 关于计件工资与工资的文献最接近这一框架 在这项研究中开发的。 为了更好地反映实际选择 面对企业，这个项目将扩大这种双向选择的情况， 到一个三种选择的情况下，计件工资，绩效工资（其中链接 工资与监管评级）和标准税率（其中 薪酬与业绩之间的联系很弱）。 在这一框架内， 相关委托代理的一些关键见解， 将纳入效率工资文献。 这一框架将 使用工业工资调查、人口普查和 和职业头衔词典。

Monitoring the performance of workers is a costly and difficult procedure for many firms and, thus, the information about worker productivity is often very imperfect. While this fact is fairly obvious, the implications of this for the way in which workers are compensated is not. Because compensation schemes can have an enormous impact on worker productivity, the implications of worker compensation arrangements have been an important theme in labor economics and economic theory generally. The extent to which employers monitor workers and use what they learn from monitoring in setting wages is a topic which has been tackled from a number of theoretical perspectives. Of these, the literature on piece rates vs. salaries is closest to the framework developed in this study. In order to better reflect choices actually faced by firms, this project will extend this two-way choice situation to a three-way choice situation of piece rates, merit pay (which links wages to supervisory ratings) and standard rates (in which there is only a weak link between pay and performance). Within this framework, some of the key insights of the related principal-agent and efficiency-wage literature will be incorporated. This framework will be developed using data from the Industrial Wage Survey, the Census of Manufacturing and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.