Tax Compliance: The Role of Opportunity, Sanctions and Tax Practitioners

税务合规：机会、制裁和税务从业者的作用

• 批准号: 8709573
• 负责人: Daniel Nagin
• 金额: $ 13.13万
• 依托单位: Carnegie-Mellon University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-11-15 至 1991-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8709573&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Tax; Compliance; Role; Opportunity; Sanctions

Why taxpayers do or do not comply with tax laws is emerging as a focal point of scholarly research. The patterns of noncompliance are influenced by incentives and opportunities. To a considerable extent the anatomy of noncompliance can be uncovered by empirical inquiry into line-by-line statements on tax returns which are influenced by enforcement efforts and the quality of opportunities to conceal income or exaggerate deductions. Paid third parties prepare nearly half of all tax returns and these returns account for about 75 percent of the tax deficiencies identified in all returns submitted to the Internal Revenue Service. Concentrating on the factors that affect compliance behavior for those individuals who voluntarily file a tax return and who also account for the large majority of estimated noncompliance and utilizing information from a variety of sources importantly including Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program audit data; Drs. Nagin and Klepper develop, formalize, and test the limits of the perspective that incentives and opportunity play an important role in compliance behavior, and they examine the role of tax practitioners as an information conduit by which threats of audit and fine are channeled into changes in reported income and deductions. Since, for the sake of simplicity, modelling in the area of tax compliance has generally been based on an idealized tax code, an important scientific contribution that the research of Drs. Nagin and Klepper makes is in linking the wide variation in opportunities available for noncompliance to the detailed structure of the actual tax code.

为什么纳税人遵守或不遵守税法正在成为焦点 学术研究的重点。 不服从的模式是 受到激励和机会的影响。 在相当程度上 不服从的解剖可以通过对以下方面的实证调查来揭示： 受以下因素影响的纳税申报表的逐行报表 执法努力和隐瞒收入机会的质量 或夸大扣除。 付费第三方准备了近一半的 所有的纳税申报表，这些申报表约占75%， 在提交给内部的所有申报表中发现税务缺陷 收入服务。 关注影响合规性的因素 对于那些自愿提交纳税申报表的个人， 在估计的不遵守情况中，卫生组织也占绝大多数， 利用各种来源的信息，重要的是， 纳税人合规衡量计划审计数据;纳金博士和 Klepper开发、形式化并测试了透视图的局限性， 奖励和机会在遵守方面发挥重要作用 行为，他们研究税务从业人员作为一个 信息渠道，通过这些渠道，审计和罚款威胁得以传播 报告的收入和扣除额的变化。 因为，为了 简单性，税收合规领域的建模通常 基于理想化的税法，这是一项重要的科学贡献 纳金博士和克莱珀博士的研究是将 不遵守《公约》的可能性差别很大， 实际税法的详细结构。