Economic Effects of Alternative Compensation Systems

替代性补偿制度的经济影响

• 批准号: 8710795
• 负责人: Derek Jones
• 金额: $ 3.68万
• 依托单位: Hamilton College
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-08-01 至 1989-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8710795&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Economic; Effects; Alternative; Compensation; Systems

Much recent economic research has focused on compensation systems for labor and management which might be an effective alternative to the wage system. Most of the attention has centered on a system of profit sharing or employee ownership, wherein workers are compensated not only by wages but also by a share of the firm's profits. Of particular interest to both academicians and policy makers is the enormous potential importance of structures internal to the firm, especially those that provide for flexible pay, in determining macroeconomic outcomes. There are, however, many other possible sharing arrangements, and in principle they will also have many ramifications other than affecting inflation, unemployment and other macoreconomic variables. They could as well affect investment decisions and productivity. Past work has shown that sharing schemes take one of four different basic forms: 1) arrangements in which employees are remunerated by a share of the firm's profits but do not own stock nor exercise managerial control in the firm, 2) systems where employees own shares in the company, but have no role in the decisions of management, 3) firms which are managed entirely by labor, and 4) firms in which labor and management share in the decisions. Many specific arrangements are variations on these four basic configurations. Given the importance of profit sharing systems, there is a dearth of solid empirical work done on these issues. This project fills that gap by generating rigorous econometric evidence on the association between degrees of profit sharing and various economic indicators including productivity, investment rates, enterprise formation, and firm survival. Using a very rich and detailed set of panel data previously constructed by Professor Jones on profit sharing firms in Great Britain, France, and the United States, this project provides estimates of labor and wage equations, production functions, and productivity equations. These enable Professor Jones and other researchers to ascertain the structure and the mechanism by which labor compensation arrangements affect the macroeconomy.

最近的许多经济研究都集中在薪酬制度， 劳动和管理，这可能是一个有效的替代， 工资制度。 大多数注意力都集中在利润系统上 员工所有权，其中工人得到补偿， 不仅是工资，而且是公司利润的一部分。 的 学者和决策者特别感兴趣的是， 公司内部结构的巨大潜在重要性， 特别是那些提供弹性薪酬的国家， 宏观经济成果。 然而，还有许多其他可能的 共享安排，原则上他们也将有许多 影响通货膨胀、失业和其他 宏观经济变量 它们也可能影响投资 决策和生产力。 过去的研究表明，共享方案采取四种不同的方式之一， 基本形式：（1）雇员的报酬由 分享公司利润，但不拥有股票，也不行使 公司的管理控制，2）员工拥有股份的制度 在公司中，但在管理决策中没有作用，3） 完全由劳动力管理的企业，以及4）劳动力 和管理层参与决策。 许多具体安排是 这四种基本配置的变体。 鉴于利润分享制度的重要性， 在这些问题上做了扎实的实证工作。 这个项目填补了 通过产生严格的计量经济学证据， 利润分享程度和各种经济指标之间的关系 包括生产率、投资率、企业组建， 坚定的生存。 使用一组非常丰富和详细的面板数据 以前由琼斯教授构建的利润分享公司， 英国，法国和美国，这个项目提供了 劳动力和工资方程的估计，生产函数， 生产力方程式 这使琼斯教授和其他 研究人员确定的结构和机制， 劳动报酬安排影响宏观经济。