Collective Choice and Producer Cartels

农业销售委员会，生产者卡特尔， 国际商品组织和分配委员会 通常根据委员会的决定限制产量。 的 一般来说，决定是投票的结果。 这种行为 组织显然具有重要的经济意义 后果 尽管如此，投票方面的决定， 以前没有得到注意， 经济学专业。这项调查的目的是 开发模型，以便更好地了解 这些组织将做出的决定。 在他们之前的研究中，研究人员开发了一些 关于农业销售委员会的提案。 的 同样的命题也适用于生产者卡特尔 只要成员国的规模或能力不同，而不是费用不同。 在 在这项研究中，研究人员重新审视了这些命题， 成员的费用也可能不同。 虽然一些 早期的命题仍然是真的（即使它们的证明必须是正确的）。 修订，以纳入新的假设），几个命题 不再有效。 例如，如果卡特尔成员仅在 大小，选择的配额将导致价格低于 使利润最大化的配额。 也就是市场营销方面 通常被忽视的董事会使他们更具竞争力 比通常想象的要多。 如果卡特尔成员 有不同的成本，结果可能是， 相反：投票通过的配额可能比配额更紧 最大化联合利润 这个项目的方法是直接的。 利润 在接下来的经济博弈中， 任何给定配额的选择首先被推导。 这些“诱导 偏好“（每个选民的均衡利润是 标量配额），然后用来检查在平衡 优先投票游戏 结果是一个联合的政治/经济 均衡 考虑到成本、需求、产能等外部数据， 投票规则，委员会的组成，模型 可以用来预测每个委员会成员将如何投票， 将选择配额，以及将产生什么经济后果 跟随. 从经济学的角度来看，这一研究是有价值的 因为它解决了一个重要但被忽视的问题 限制组织。 从投票理论的角度来看， 在政治学中，这一研究是有价值和重要的 因为一个存在的自然充分条件 证明了不涉及单个 诱导偏好的峰值。 最后，从一项政策 从这个角度来看，这项研究导致了对 卡特尔和营销委员会造成的福利损失。 而且 模型阐明了政治干预如何使经济 方面的影响. 委员会组成的变化， 他们的投票权，以及其他外在的 政治因素导致经济后果。

Agricultural marketing boards, producer cartels, international commodity organizations, and prorationing boards typically restrict output based on a committee decision. The decision is generally the result of a vote. The behavior of such organizations obviously has important economic consequences. Nonetheless, the voting aspect of the decision making has previously received no attention from the economics profession.The purpose of this investigation is to develop models which will permit a better understanding of the decisions such organizations will make. In their prior research the investigators developed a number of propositions concerning agricultural marketing boards. The same propositions were then shown to hold for producer cartels provided members differed only in size or capacity, not cost. In this research the investigators reexamine the propositions when members may also differ in their costs. While some of the earlier propositions remain true (even if their proofs must be revised to incorporate new assumptions), several propositions are no longer valid. For example, if cartel members differ only in size, the quota selected will result in a lower price than the quota which maximizes profits. That is, the aspect of marketing boards which is typically neglected makes them more competitive than is commonly supposed. However, if cartel members have different costs, it turns out that the result may be reversed: the quota voted for may be even tighter than the quota which maximizes joint profits. The methodology of this project is straight forward. The profits which each voter would receive in the economic game which follows selection of any given quota are first deduced. These "induced preferences "(equilibrium profits to each voter as a function of the scalar quota) are then used to examine the equilibrium in the prior voting game. The result is a joint political/economic equilibrium. Given exogenous data on costs, demand, capacity, the voting rules, and the composition of the committee, the model can be used to predict how each committee member will vote, what quota will be selected, and what economic consequences will follow. From the view point of economics, this research is valuable because it addresses an important but overlooked aspect of volume restricting organizations. From the viewpoint of voting theory in political science, the research is valuable and important because a natural sufficiency condition for the existence of a Condorcet point is proved which does not involve single peakedness of the induced preferences. Finally, from a policy point of view the research leads to revised assessments of the welfare losses from cartels and marketing boards. Moreover, the model clarifies how political interventions can have economic effects. Changes in the composition of the committee, the weights attached to their votes, and other exogenous political factors induce economic consequences.