Corporate Financial Structure and the Theory of the Firm

公司财务结构和公司理论

• 批准号: 8720769
• 负责人: Oliver Hart
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing grant
• 财政年份: 1988
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1988-04-01 至 1992-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8720769&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Corporate; Financial; Structure; Theory; Firm

This project continues the principal investigator's work on contracting and control issues in firms and corporations. Its aim is to gain a better understanding of several critical unanswered questions: (1) What determines the structure of securities in corporations and the allocation of voting rights across these securities? For example, why do shareholders typically have votes, while bondholders do not except when a firm is in financial distress? (2) How do friendly mergers and hostile takeovers differ as mechanisms for achieving changes in corporate control? (3) What determines the nature and extent of a firm? Still other questions must be addressed before a full-blown theory of the firm can be achieved. But that prospect, and the successes to date, provide a powerful spur for persisting on the present course.

该项目延续了首席研究员的工作， 公司和企业的合同和控制问题。 其 目的是更好地了解几个关键的 未回答的问题：（1）是什么决定了 公司证券和表决权的分配 在这些证券？ 例如，为什么股东 通常有投票权，而债券持有人没有，除非公司 陷入财务困境了吗 (2)如何友好的合并和 敌意收购作为实现变革的机制， 公司控制权？ (3)是什么决定了 一家公司？ 还有其他问题必须在全面展开之前解决。 企业理论是可以实现的。 但这种前景， 迄今为止的成功，为坚持 目前的航线