Bankruptcy Reform and Financial Contracting

破产改革与金融承包

• 批准号: 9320845
• 负责人: Oliver Hart
• 金额: $ 18.6万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1994
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1994-08-01 至 1998-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9320845&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Bankruptcy; Reform; Financial; Contracting

9320845 Hart This project continues research on the financial structure of firms and bankruptcy reform that were stimulated by and are relevant to the political and economic changes in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Specifically, the investigator and collaborators have devised new bankruptcy procedures which appear to be superior to Chapters 7 and 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. This project will study theoretical and practical questions raised by the procedure. The investigator will also continue work on entrepreneurial debt contracts, corporate financial structure and the theory of the firm. Under the previous project the investigator studied bankruptcy procedure as part of the transitions to capitalism in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. This research led to a new bankruptcy procedure that the investigators found to be superior to existing procedures. Under this bankruptcy procedure, a bankrupt firm's debts are cancelled, all the equity is given to the former creditors and these creditors as the new owners decide whether the firm should be sold off for cash or reorganized as a going concern. The judge supervising the procedure solicits cash and noncash bids. In a noncash bid, someone offers securities in the post-bankruptcy firm instead of cash. For example, the old management team or a new management team could offer the new owners of the firm a combination of shares and bonds in the post-bankruptcy firm. The creditors would decide by a simple majority vote which bid to select. The firm then exits from bankruptcy. This procedure is superior to existing bankruptcy law because it transforms a group of people with different claims and therefore different objectives into a homogeneous class of shareholders with a common objective (value maximization) and then puts the firm's future to a simple majority vote. The procedure avoids costly and inefficient haggling over the division of the assets of a bankrupt firm be cause it provides a mechanical procedure for the division of the pie. This project pursues a number of extensions and elaborations of the proposed procedure. These extensions include analysis of alternative voting arrangements, more precise estimates of the benefits of adopting this new procedure, and an ambitious effort to derive optimal bankruptcy procedures in an incomplete contracting setting.

9320845 Hart这个项目继续研究由东欧和前苏联的政治和经济变化所刺激并与之相关的公司的财务结构和破产改革。具体来说，研究者和合作者设计了新的破产程序，似乎优于美国破产法第7章和第11章。本项目将研究该程序所提出的理论和实践问题。研究者还将继续研究企业债务合同、公司财务结构和公司理论。在之前的项目中，调查员研究了破产程序作为东欧和前苏联向资本主义过渡的一部分。这项研究产生了一种新的破产程序，调查人员发现这种程序优于现有程序。在这种破产程序下，破产公司的债务被取消，所有的股权都交给以前的债权人，这些债权人作为新的所有者决定公司是否应该出售现金或重组为持续经营企业。监督程序的法官征求现金和非现金出价。在非现金收购中，有人提供破产后公司的证券而不是现金。例如，旧的管理团队或新的管理团队可以向公司的新所有者提供破产后公司的股票和债券组合。债权人将以简单多数投票决定谁来竞标。然后公司从破产中退出。这一程序优于现有的破产法，因为它将一群拥有不同债权和不同目标的人转变为具有共同目标（价值最大化）的同质股东，然后将公司的未来交给简单多数投票。这一程序避免了为分割破产公司的资产而进行代价高昂且效率低下的讨价还价，因为它为分割蛋糕提供了一种机械的程序。这个项目对拟议的程序进行了若干扩展和阐述。这些扩展包括对替代投票安排的分析，对采用这一新程序的好处的更精确的估计，以及在不完全合同环境下得出最优破产程序的雄心勃勃的努力。