Incomplete Contracts

不完全合同

• 批准号: 9023279
• 负责人: Oliver Hart
• 金额: $ 15.51万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1991
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1991-07-01 至 1994-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9023279&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Incomplete; Contracts

This is an accomplishment-based renewal of research by one of the architects and leading contributors to the incomplete contracts paradigm for analyzing economic decisions under incomplete information. The key feature of this approach is that it incorporates transaction costs inherent in the writing of long- term contracts (for example, thinking, negotiation, writing and enforcement costs). Because of these transaction costs parties will write contracts that are incomplete ex-ante, knowing that these contracts will be renegotiated later on as new information comes in. The approach studies how this renegotiation takes place and what implications it has for agents' incentives to take various ex-ante actions. Under the previous NSF grant the investigator made important contributions in three areas: the theory of the firm, vertical integration and market foreclosure, and the financial structure of the firm. Continued support will lead to further advances in our understanding of the nature of business internal organization and financial structure. This grant continues work on contract and control issues in firms and corporations. It provides a better understanding of what determines the structure of claims in corporations and the various rights possessed by claim-holders, e.g., why debt has priority over equity, creditors have the right to liquidate assets in the event of default and equity-holders have votes. One especially interesting paper in this line of research will be a study of what lessons the emerging Eastern European democracies can learn from the Western experience with different bankruptcy procedures. The project will also continue to study how transactions within firms differ from those between firms, and what are the motives for integration by firms.

这是一个基于证据的研究更新， 建筑师和不完整合同的主要贡献者 不完全条件下的经济决策分析范式 信息. 这种方法的主要特点是， 交易成本是指在长期交易中， 定期合同（例如，思考、谈判、写作和 执行成本）。 由于这些交易成本，各方 会在事前签订不完整的合同， 这些合同将在稍后作为新信息重新谈判 的用武之 该方法研究了这种重新谈判如何进行 以及它对代理人的激励有什么影响 各种事前行动。 根据之前的NSF拨款， 调查员在三个领域作出了重要贡献： 企业理论、纵向一体化和市场止赎 以及公司的财务结构。 持续支持将 导致我们进一步了解的性质， 企业内部组织和财务结构。 这项赠款继续在公司的合同和控制问题的工作 和企业。 它提供了一个更好的理解什么 决定了公司的债权结构， 权利要求持有人拥有的各种权利，例如，为什么债务 优先于股权，债权人有权清偿 资产在违约和股权持有人有投票权。 在这一研究领域，有一篇特别有趣的论文， 一项关于新兴东欧民主国家 可以借鉴西方不同破产的经验 程序. 该项目还将继续研究如何 公司内部的交易不同于公司之间的交易， 企业整合的动机是什么？