Strategies for Judgment: A Process-Tracing Investigation of Effort and Accuracy

虽然判断的规范模型表明，偏好在启发过程中应该是不变的，但先前的研究表明，偏好容易受到许多不同的影响。这些变化包括跨响应模式的变化、描述备选和响应尺度的属性的兼容性以及顺序效应。由于这些效应与理性选择理论的基本原理相矛盾，因此不仅心理学家对它们感兴趣，经济学家和管理科学家也对它们感兴趣。这一建议表明，这些影响源于在判断中使用多种潜在策略。我们假设，决策者在一组简化策略或启发式中进行选择，以尽量减少努力，同时提供令人满意的准确性。许多观察到的任务效应可能源于这些策略的变化。提出的研究扩展了我们在建模与决策策略相关的努力和准确性方面的工作。我们提出了一系列的过程跟踪研究，这些研究试图验证建模努力和错误的框架。我们也希望通过提供一些常见判断现象的过程分析，为经验基础做出贡献。

While normative models of judgment suggest that preferences should be invariant across elicitation procedures, prior research has shown that preferences are susceptible to many different influences. These include changes across response modes, the compatibility of attributes describing the alternative and response scale, and order effects. Because these effects contradict basic tenants of theories of rational choice, they are of interests not only to psychologists, but economists and management scientists as well. This proposal suggests that these effects originate from the use of multiple underlying strategies in judgment. Decision-makers, we hypothesize, select among a set of simplified strategies, or heuristics in an attempt to minimize effort while providing satisfactory level of accuracy. Many observed task effects may have their origins in these changes in strategy. The proposed research extends our work in modeling the effort and accuracy associated with decision strategies. We propose a series of process-tacing studies which attempt to validate the framework for modeling effort and error. We also hope to contribute to the empirical base by providing process analysis of some common judgmental phenomena.