Iterative Processes of Decision Making: A Bayesian Game Theoretic Framework

决策的迭代过程：贝叶斯博弈论框架

• 批准号: 8721469
• 负责人: Brian Skyrms
• 金额: $ 1.8万
• 依托单位: University of California-Irvine
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1988
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1988-08-01 至 1991-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8721469&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Iterative; Processes; Decision; Making; Bayesian

It is a basic tenant for most of us that it is better to know something rather than nothing and to make informed decisions rather than uninformed ones. Professor Skyrms is examining the problem of how best to make decisions in a situation where the very process of deliberating about the decision generates new information which will allow us to make more informed decisions. In this dynamic deliberational process, decision makers start in a state where they are not at all certain what the best course of action should be; but by feeding back information from the deliberational process, the probabilities of doing various acts evolve until the final decision becomes clear. Such a study is focussed on questions in decision theory and game theory, but they have an important bearing upon issues in the policy sciences--for example, in debates about the best course of action in the arms race. Further, these results have important implications for the theory of scientific inference, that is on how science moves from particular instances or events to a generalizable theory which accurately describes the world about us. Professor Skryms is specifically examining the relationships of deliberational dynamics and Bayesian Game theory. Deliberational dynamics shows how the dominant solution concept of Game Theory, that of a Nash equilibrium, can be grounded on the expected utility principle of the theory of individual rational decision. Expected utility motivates dynamic deliberation, and a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a fixed point of the joint deliberational dynamics of the players of the game in question under ideal conditions of common knowledge. Professor Skyrms will investigate the stability of fixed points in the deliberational dynamics, and use this framework to throw light on the current discussions of refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept in both normal form and extensive form games. He will also investigate the results of weakening the strong common knowledge assumptions required in the foregoing with regard to both the initial state of indecision and the fact that all players of the game are Bayesian deliberators. He will show that minimal weakening of these assumptions can have dramatic effects on the possible rational solutions for games that are important in modeling real life decisions.

对于我们大多数人来说，知道一些事情总比什么都不知道好，做出明智的决定比不知情的决定更好，这是我们大多数人的基本原则。Skyrms教授正在研究如何在这样一个情况下最好地做出决定，在这种情况下，对决定的审议过程产生了新的信息，这将使我们能够做出更明智的决定。在这个动态的审议过程中，决策者从根本不确定最佳行动方案的状态开始；但通过从审议过程中反馈信息，采取各种行动的可能性不断演变，直到最终决定变得清晰。这种研究侧重于决策论和博弈论中的问题，但它们对政策科学中的问题有重要影响--例如，在关于军备竞赛最佳行动方针的辩论中。此外，这些结果对科学推理理论有重要的影响，即科学如何从特定的实例或事件转移到准确描述我们周围世界的可概括的理论。斯克里姆斯教授正在专门研究商议动力学和贝叶斯博弈论之间的关系。演绎动力学展示了博弈论的主导解概念，即纳什均衡的概念，如何建立在个人理性决策理论的预期效用原则的基础上。期望效用激励动态商议，纳什均衡对应于在共同知识的理想条件下，相关博弈参与者的联合商议动力学的固定点。Skyrms教授将研究审议动力学中不动点的稳定性，并使用这个框架来阐明目前在规范形式和广泛形式博弈中对纳什均衡概念精炼的讨论。他还将调查削弱上述关于优柔寡断的初始状态和游戏中所有玩家都是贝叶斯审判者这一事实所需的强烈常识假设的结果。他将展示，对这些假设的最小程度削弱，可以对对现实生活决策建模至关重要的游戏的可能理性解决方案产生戏剧性的影响。