Iterative Processes of Decision Making: A Bayesian Game Theoretic Framework

这是一个基本的租户，我们大多数人，这是更好地了解 有而不是没有，并作出明智的决定 而不是无知的人 Skyrms教授正在研究 如何最好地做出决策的问题，在这种情况下， 每一次对决策的审议过程都会产生新的 这些信息将使我们能够做出更明智的决定。 在这个动态的审议过程中，决策者开始在 一个国家，他们根本不确定什么是最好的过程， 行动应该是;但通过反馈信息， 审议过程，做各种行为的可能性 直到最后的决定变得清晰。 此类研究 专注于决策论和博弈论的问题， 他们对政策中的问题有重要影响， 科学--例如，在关于最佳行动方案的辩论中， 在军备竞赛中。 此外，这些结果具有重要的 对科学推理理论的影响，即 科学是如何从特定的实例或事件发展到 一种可以概括的理论，它准确地描述了世界， 我们 斯克里姆斯教授专门研究了 慎思动力学和贝叶斯博弈论。 深思熟虑的 动态显示了博弈论的主导解决方案概念， 纳什均衡，可以建立在预期的基础上 个人理性决策理论的效用原则。 期望效用激发了动态思考， 平衡对应于关节的固定点 参与者的审议动态 在常识的理想条件下。 Skyrms教授 将研究不动点在 审议动力学，并使用这个框架来阐明 目前关于纳什均衡的改进的讨论 概念在正常形式和广泛形式的游戏。 他将 还调查了削弱强共同性的结果， 上述关于以下方面的知识假设 无论是最初的犹豫不决的状态和事实， 博弈的参与者是贝叶斯审议者。 他会证明 对这些假设的最小削弱可能会产生戏剧性的影响 一些重要博弈的合理解 在模拟真实的生活中的决定。

It is a basic tenant for most of us that it is better to know something rather than nothing and to make informed decisions rather than uninformed ones. Professor Skyrms is examining the problem of how best to make decisions in a situation where the very process of deliberating about the decision generates new information which will allow us to make more informed decisions. In this dynamic deliberational process, decision makers start in a state where they are not at all certain what the best course of action should be; but by feeding back information from the deliberational process, the probabilities of doing various acts evolve until the final decision becomes clear. Such a study is focussed on questions in decision theory and game theory, but they have an important bearing upon issues in the policy sciences--for example, in debates about the best course of action in the arms race. Further, these results have important implications for the theory of scientific inference, that is on how science moves from particular instances or events to a generalizable theory which accurately describes the world about us. Professor Skryms is specifically examining the relationships of deliberational dynamics and Bayesian Game theory. Deliberational dynamics shows how the dominant solution concept of Game Theory, that of a Nash equilibrium, can be grounded on the expected utility principle of the theory of individual rational decision. Expected utility motivates dynamic deliberation, and a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a fixed point of the joint deliberational dynamics of the players of the game in question under ideal conditions of common knowledge. Professor Skyrms will investigate the stability of fixed points in the deliberational dynamics, and use this framework to throw light on the current discussions of refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept in both normal form and extensive form games. He will also investigate the results of weakening the strong common knowledge assumptions required in the foregoing with regard to both the initial state of indecision and the fact that all players of the game are Bayesian deliberators. He will show that minimal weakening of these assumptions can have dramatic effects on the possible rational solutions for games that are important in modeling real life decisions.