Justification for, and Developments of, Solution Concepts for Games

这个项目是数理经济学的一部分，数理经济学是经济学的一个重要组成部分。 研究，定义了严格的分析框架， 经济推理。 更具体地说，该项目扩展了 的合理性的公理化特征 非合作博弈的参与者 玩家的理性是 根据单人决策理论公理定义， 玩家可以有“字典式”的信念。 这 方法被扩展（1）到更一般的单个人 （2）在信仰中加入以下概念： 前向归纳合理性;（3）允许非预期 实用性偏好，以检查适用性和 最近制定的此类优惠的相关性 （4）将“满意”与“满意”结合起来， 在统一的方法内的“谨慎”行为;（5）允许 玩家可以通过添加一个 游戏前通信设备。 该项目的总体目标是提高我们的 了解应用程序中流行的解决方案概念 运用博弈论的原理， 可以被纳入非合作博弈论。 这是 重要的是，因为游戏的非合作解决方案的概念， 特别是纳什均衡，经常被应用于经济 模型 通过检查其中几个假设的基础， 解决方案的概念，这个项目明确的假设 应用这些模型的经济模型的基本预测 博弈论工具 因为对于大多数经济模型， 多重均衡，检验基本假设 不同的解决方案可以帮助分析人员在 平衡，并提供了一种统一的方法来做出更准确的预测 在许多模型中。

This project is part of mathematical economics, a crucial body of research that defines the analytical framework for rigorous economic reasoning. More specifically, this project extends the investigator's axiomatic characterizations of the rationality of players in non-cooperative games. The players' rationality is defined in terms of single person decision theoretic axioms and players are allowed to have "lexicographic" beliefs. This approach is extended (1) to a more general single person framework; (2) to incorporate into the beliefs the notion of forward induction rationality; (3) to allow for non expected utility preferences in order to examine the applicability and relevance of such preferences which have recently been developed quite extensively; (4) to incorporate both "satisficing" and "cautious" behavior within a unified approach; and (5) to allow for players to signal their intended strategies by adding a preplay communication device to a game. The overall objective of this project is to increase our understanding of solution concepts prevalent in the applications of game theory, and to apply this to see how certain properties can be incorporated into non-cooperative game theory. This is important because non-cooperative solution concepts of games, in particular Nash Equilibrium, are often applied to economic models. By examining the assumptions underlying several of these solution concepts, this project makes explicit the assumptions underlying predictions of the economic models which apply these game theoretic tools. Since for most economic models there are multiple equilibria, examination of the assumptions underlying the different solutions helps the analyst select among the equilibria and provides a unified way to make sharper predictions in many models.