Sequential Voting Models

顺序投票模型

• 批准号: 9730493
• 负责人: Eddie Dekel
• 金额: $ 19.21万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1998
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1998-04-01 至 2002-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9730493&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Sequential; Voting; Models

Project Abstract The proposal contains two parts. The first and main part is joint work with Michele Piccione. In voting models, which underlie much recent research in political economy, the voting can have two roles: it can aggregate private information and / or preferences. Whereas in most voting models the electorate votes simultaneously on each issue, we analyze sequential voting games. This makes it possible to address many interesting questions on both roles of voting. For example, concerning aggregating information, which mechanism is better: simultaneous or sequential voting? When the electorate can choose when to vote, will they choose a method that is efficient for aggregating information? We also study the implications of two opposing considerations in voting earlier or later: early voters are more likely to determine the set of `relevant` alternatives and later voters will know which alternatives are relevant and hence are less likely to `waste` their vote. What sequential structures will then occur when voters can chose when to vote? Will voters who expect to have similar preferences choose to vote close together or far apart in time? The project addresses these and other questions that arise from considering sequential voting environments. This sheds light on the implications of states `gaming` on when to have their primaries, or of announcing the outcomes of votes in some districts before voting is completed in others. The second part contains two projects on the foundations of game theory (but that are otherwise unrelated). The first, joint with Bart Lipman and Aldo Rustichini, derives unique subjective probabilities for the model of unforeseen contingencies proposed by Kreps* and further extended by the three of us in earlier work. The second, joint with Drew Fudenberg and David Levine, develops, for games of incomplete information, solution concepts that are based on learning, such as the notion of self-confirming equilibria, and that incorporate rationality as well. *D. M. Kreps (1979): `A Representation Theorem for 'Preference for Flexibility',` Econometrica 47 565 - 576.

项目摘要本提案包括两个部分。 第一部分也是主要部分是与Michele Piccione的合作。 在作为政治经济学最新研究基础的投票模型中，投票可以扮演两个角色：它可以聚合私人信息和/或偏好。 鉴于在大多数投票模型中，选民同时对每个问题进行投票，我们分析了顺序投票游戏。 这使得有可能解决许多有趣的问题，这两个作用的投票。例如，关于汇总信息，哪种机制更好：同时投票还是顺序投票？ 当选民可以选择何时投票时，他们会选择一种有效的信息汇总方法吗？ 我们还研究了两个相反的考虑因素在投票早或晚的影响：早选民更有可能确定的一套“相关”的替代品和后来的选民会知道哪些替代品是相关的，因此不太可能“浪费”他们的选票。 当选民可以选择何时投票时，会出现什么样的顺序结构？期望有相似偏好的选民会选择在时间上接近还是远离投票？ 该项目解决了这些和其他问题，考虑顺序投票环境中出现的。 这揭示了各州在初选时间上的“博弈”，或者在其他选区完成投票之前宣布某些选区的投票结果的含义。 第二部分包含两个项目的基础上的博弈论（但其他无关）。 第一个，与巴特·李普曼和阿尔多·鲁斯蒂奇尼联合，为克雷普斯提出的不可预见的偶然事件模型推导出独特的主观概率，我们三人在早期的工作中进一步扩展了这个模型。 第二部分与德鲁·福登伯格（Drew Fudenberg）和大卫·莱文（David Levine）合作，为不完全信息的博弈发展了基于学习的解决方案概念，如自我确认均衡的概念，并将理性也纳入其中。 *D. M. Kreps（1979）：“A Representation Theorem for 'Preference for Accessibility'，'Econometrica 47 565 - 576.