The Evolution of Optimizing Behavior and of Attitudes Toward Risk

这个项目涉及进化博弈论。 它有 两个目标：探索优化行为的演变， 对风险的态度。 经济学的一个基本假设是， 代理优化 本项目通过询问以下问题来检验这一假设 进化（和其他动态）力量是否会导致 消除非优化行为。 作者特别 将寻找进化力量 选择优化行为;他们还将探索 非优化行为的形式确实存在（在 是合理的，但不足以保证灭绝 非优化行为）。 更具体地说， 学习和进化的力量在规则的选择，而不是 将对策略进行研究。 相对于 对风险态度的演变，重要的是要知道 战略互动的形式会导致对风险的态度。 例如，已知赢者通吃的游戏导致 冒险行为。 这将有助于调查， 例如，什么形式的市场互动将导致 过度冒险行为。 这项研究很重要，因为 它将提高我们对优化的进化的理解， 行为和对风险的态度。

This project is concerned with evolutionary game theory. It has two objectives: to explore the evolution of optimizing behavior and of attitudes toward risk. A basic presumption in economics is that agents optimize. This project examines this presumption by asking whether evolutionary (and other dynamic) forces will lead to the extinction of non-optimizing behavior. In particular, the authors will search for conditions under which evolutionary forces do select for optimizing behavior; and they will also explore what form of non-optimizing behavior does survive (in environments which are plausible but not sufficient to guarantee the extinction of non-optimizing behavior). More specifically, the interaction of learning and evolutionary forces in the selection of rules rather than strategies will be investigated. With regards to the evolution of attitudes towards risk it is important to know what forms of strategic interaction lead to what attitudes towards risk. For example, it is known that winner-takes-all games lead to risking-taking behavior. This will be useful for investigating, for instance, what forms of market interaction will lead to excessive risk taking behavior. This research is important because it will improve our understanding of the evolution of optimizing behavior and of attitudes toward risk.