Endogenous Rates of Experimentation; Dynamics in Non-Partition Information Models; and Competition in Herd/Cascade Models
Endogenous Rates of Experimentation; Dynamics in Non-Partition Information Models; and Competition in Herd/Cascade Models
批准号:
9409302
负责人:
Eddie Dekel
金额:
$19.1万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
1994
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1994-10-15 至 1998-09-30
中文摘要
9409302德克尔这个项目专注于三个研究主题:(1)实验和或突变是最近经济学学习和进化研究中使用的模型的重要组成部分。该提案开发了实验速率本身被学习或模仿的模型,然后探索环境的不同方面如何影响长期出现的实验速率。(2)个人接收的可能信息并不划分世界状态集的模型已被用于将有限理性的各种元素引入决策和博弈论。然而,这些模型隐含地假设玩家不知道他们的信息集,而游戏中的应用往往隐含地假设信息结构是常识。这项研究通过明确开发玩家如何使用他们的信息的动态过程来探索这种明显的冲突。一个相关的目标是开发一个显式的健忘模型,看看它与没有分区的一般模型是如何对应的。(3)羊群模型,或信息级联模型,买家模仿之前的买家,而不是使用他们自己的私人信息,忽视了这样一个事实,即卖家有强烈的动机诱使买家为他们自己的产品创造羊群/级联。这项研究将探索这种情况可能发生的程度,哪些类型的卖家会投资于虚假地制造羊群/级联,以及当卖家试图制造羊群/级联时,使用的信息是多还是少。
英文摘要
9409302 Dekel This project focuses on three research topics: (1) Experiments and or mutations are an important ingredient in the models used in the recent research on learning and evolution in economics. The proposal develops models where rates of experimentation are themselves learned or mimicked and then explores how different aspects of the environment influence the rate of experimentation that arises in the long run. (2) Models where the possible information received by an individual does not partition the set of states of the world have been used to introduce various elements of bounded rationality into decision making and game theory. However, these models implicitly assume that players are unaware of their information sets, while the applications in games often implicitly assume that the information structure is common knowledge. The research explores this apparent conflict by explicitly developing a dynamic process of how players use their information. A related objective is to develop an explicit model of forgetfulness to see how it corresponds to the general models without partitions. (3) Models of herds, or informational cascades, where buyers mimic preceding buyers rather than using their own private information ignore the fact that sellers have strong incentives to entice buyers to create a herd/cascade for their own product. The research will explore the extent to which this can happen, what types of sellers will invest in falsely creating herds/cascades, and whether more or less information is used when sellers are activity trying to create herds/cascades.
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会议论文
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