Crises, Realism, and War, 1816-1980

这项研究是正在进行的行动调查的一部分， 各国在争端中的互动达到危机水平， 就是战争威胁存在的时候 调查的目的 是为了更好地了解什么类型的行动，或 谈判策略，与战争的爆发有关， 在不诉诸战争的情况下解决危机是最有效的。 这项研究还调查了什么影响以前的危机经验 很可能会影响政治家选择的谈判策略 当他们发现自己的国家陷入连续的危机， 对手。 本节特别侧重于中东和 美苏危机 研究人员随机抽取了40个发生在 在1816年到1980年间 对于每一次危机， 和新闻报道被用来构建 参与者的行动。 反过来， 已经被转换成机器可读的描述， 分析了 这有助于根据以下方面对危机进行分类： 不同的行为类型，这是基于冲突的模式， 的行动中所显示的升级-降级和互惠 参与者 那么就有可能考虑 类型是最容易或最不容易发生战争的，什么情况下最容易发生战争？ 可能会产生这些类型。 也可以分析 国家在使用不同的讨价还价方式时的行动和反应 在他们试图影响另一方的过程中 的危机。 这有助于搜索问题的答案 关于哪种谈判策略最常与 战争的结果，以及哪些最有可能让政治家避免战争， 而不需要付出屈服于对方的代价。 迄今为止完成的研究表明，政治家倾向于采取一种 危机谈判的现实政治方法，规定使用 强制策略和强烈的决心。 还有 有证据表明，特别是在平等竞争的国家中， 权力，使用不断升级的胁迫策略与战争有关 成果。 此外，有迹象表明， 推理适用于政治家从过去的经验中吸取的“教训”。 危机的经验，这往往使每一个连续的危机， 更危险 初步调查结果还表明， “互惠”战略，将达特的反应与提供 合作可能是最有效的整体危机谈判策略。 调查将采取更彻底和严格的看看 这些初步调查结果的有效性以及一系列其他 与危机中国家行为相关的问题。

This research is part of an ongoing investigation of the actions and interactions of nations in disputes that reach the crisis level, that is when the threat of war is present. The purpose of the investigation is to develop a better understanding of what types of actions, or bargaining strategies, are associated with the outbreak of war and what types are most effective in resolving crises without resort to war. The study also investigates what effects previous crisis experiences are likely to have on the bargaining strategies chosen by statesmen when they find their states engaged in successive crises with the same adversary. This section focuses particularly on the Middle East and U.S. - Soviet Crises. The researcher employs a random sample of forty crises occurring between 1816 to 1980. For each of these crises, diplomatic histories and press accounts have been used to construct verbal chronologies of the actions of the participants. The verbal chronologies, in turn, have been converted into machine readable descriptions that may be analyzed. This facilitates classifying the crises according to distinct behavioral types, which are based on the patterns of conflict escalation-deescalation and reciprocity shown in the actions of the participants. Then it becomes possible to consider which behavioral types are most, or least, war-prone, and what conditions are most likely to produce those types. It is also possible to analyze the actions and reactions of states as they use different bargaining strategies in their attempts to influence the other side in the course of the crisis. This facilitates the search for answers to questions regarding which bargaining strategies are most often associated with war outcomes, and which are most likely to allow statesmen to avoid war without having to pay the price of submission to the other side. The research completed to date suggests that statesmen tend to adopt a realpolitik approach to crisis bargaining that prescribes the use of coercive tactics and a strong demonstration of resolve. There is also evidence that, particularly among states that are evenly matched in power, the use of escalating coercive tactics is associated with war outcomes. In addition, there is some indication that realpolitik reasoning is applied to the "lessons" that statesmen draw from previous crisis experiences and that this tends to make each successive crisis more dangerous. Preliminary findings also suggest that a "reciprocating" strategy combining tit-for-tat responses with offers to cooperate may be the most effective overall crisis bargaining strategy. The investigation will take a more thorough and rigorous look at the validity of these preliminary findings as well as a range of other questions associated with the behavior of states in crises.