Collaborative Research on Organized Group Influence on Federal Judicial Nominations

在20世纪80年代，利益集团扩大了支持或反对联邦司法提名的游说努力。随着联邦司法机构在意识形态方面的分歧变得更加平均，参议院司法委员会和参议院的有组织的利益集团发生了冲突。关于提名博克法官为最高法院协理法官和其他不太显眼的任命的辩论中涉及的利益集团的非同寻常的动员程度和强度和数量表明了一种新的司法提名政治风格：有组织的利益集团被激活以影响司法提名，它们表明了继续这样做的承诺。然而，很难孤立和追踪利益集团可能对此类斗争产生的影响。关于利益集团为什么、是否、如何以及在什么情况下影响司法提名程序，人们知之甚少。该项目将首次深入定量分析美国参议院在联邦司法提名问题上的利益集团游说活动。参加这些比赛的数百个国家、州和地方级别的团体和联盟的个人将被确定和采访。问题将集中在针对不同参议员的相对游说努力、不同策略的使用(例如，直接邮件、媒体广告)、每个州活跃成员的规模、组织内部参加特定提名或加入联盟的决定，以及有组织利益集团之间的沟通模式。这项研究的目的是(1)评估有组织的游说活动对参议员支持或反对有争议的联邦司法机构提名的决定的影响，(2)确定有组织的团体如何在各州和参议员之间分配他们的游说资源，以及(3)开发和测试组织决策模型，以参与司法提名之争。这项研究将为在特定和明确定义的立法过程中动员、集体行动战略和有组织的利益的影响提供新的见解。这项研究应该有助于形成一个关于利益集团如何进入和离开各种政治和法律舞台的统一理论。由于司法确认处于立法和司法决策的交汇点，这项研究还应该增加我们对有组织的利益集团塑造最高法院人员的能力的理解，从而增加对宪法、法规和行政法规未来解释的理解。

During the 1980s, interest groups have expanded their lobbying efforts on behalf of or in opposition to federal judicial nominations. As the federal judiciary has become more evenly divided along ideological lines, organized interests have clashed in the Senate Judiciary Committee and on the floor of the Senate. The extraordinary degree of mobilization and the intensity and numbers of interest groups involved in the debate over the nomination of Judge Bork as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and of other less visible appointments suggest a new style of judicial nominating politics: Organized interest groups are activated to influence judicial nominations, and they demonstrate a commitment to continue to do so. It is difficult, however, to isolate and trace the influence that interest groups might have on such battles. Little is known about why, whether, how, and under what circumstances interest groups affect the judicial nomination process. This project will be the first in-depth quantitative analysis of interest group lobbying of the U.S. Senate on federal judicial nominations. Individuals from hundreds of groups and coalitions at the national, state, and local levels that participated in these contests will be identified and interviewed. Questions will focus on such issues as the relative lobbying efforts devoted to different senators, the use of different tactics (e.g., direct mail, media advertising), the size of active membership in each state, the decision within an organization to take part in a particular nomination or join a coalition, and patterns of communication among organized interests. The objectives of the study are to (1) assess the impact of organized lobbying efforts on the decisions of senators to support or oppose controversial nominations to the federal judiciary, (2) determine how organized groups allocate their lobbying resources across states and senators, and (3) develop and test a model of organizational decisions to participate in judicial nomination battles. This research will provide new insights into the mobilization, collective action strategies, and impact of organized interests in a specific and well-defined legislative process. The study should aid in the development of a unified theory of how interest groups maneuver into and out of the various political and legal arenas. Because judicial confirmation is at the intersection of legislative and judicial policymaking, the research should also add to our understanding of the ability of organized interests to shape the personnel of the Court and thus future interpretations of the Constitution, statutes, and administrative regulations.