Social Dilemmas With Uncertain Resources

当群体成员共享所有人都可以自由使用的有限资源时，就会产生资源困境。、地下水、能源、矿产、濒危物种。)当群体成员在没有相互沟通的情况下独立地从资源池中请求自己的份额时，有实验证据表明，随着资源大小的不确定性增加，人们会增加他们的请求，从而降低他们的请求被批准的概率。通过6个实验研究了资源不确定性、群体规模、群体总请求信息的实时更新等变量对两种游戏协议下资源困境解决的影响。在一种协议下，请求是同时发出的，而在另一种协议下，请求是顺序发出的，并提供有关先前请求的完整信息。所提出的实验由一个规定均衡解的博弈论模型和一个决策理论模型驱动。研究结果有助于理解资源困境中替代机制对决策行为的影响，这是现代社会面临的最严重的问题之一。

Resource dilemmas are created when group members shared limited resources to which all have free access(e.g., groundwater, energy, minerals, endangered species.) When group members request their share from the resource pool independently, with no communication among them, there is experimental evidence showing that as the uncertainty about the size of the resource increases, people increase their requests thereby lowering the probability that their request will be granted. Six experiments are proposed to study the effects of several variables (e.g., amount of uncertainty about the resource, group size, real-time updating of information about total group request) about the resolution of resource dilemmas under two protocols of play. Under one protocol, requests are made simultaneously, and under the other, sequentially with full information about previous requests. The proposed experiments are driven by a game theoretical model prescribing an equilibrium solution and by a decision theoretical model. The findings should be useful in understanding the effects of alternative mechanisms on decision behavior in resource dilemmas, which are among the most serious problems facing modern society.