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Interacting Signals and Cheap Talk Games

Interacting Signals and Cheap Talk Games
交互信号和廉价的谈话游戏
批准号:
9111249
负责人:
Steven Matthews
金额:
$8.83万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1991
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1991-08-01 至 1994-07-31

项目摘要

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中文摘要
翻译
本研究以传播学为研究对象,分为两部分。第一部分涉及多方发出代价高昂的信号。除了少数例外,信号一直被建模为一个知情发送者的游戏。这在有多个知情人士的情况下是不合适的。例如,业内人士往往比局外人更了解自己所在行业或对方的产品,他们的许多行为,如定价、投资或广告选择,都是由局外人分开观察的。这样的发送者在信令领域“竞争”,以影响接收者的信念。本研究将建立相关私人信息环境下的信号竞争模型。重点将放在信号竞争减少不对称信息损失的条件上。第二部分是关于不费钱的沟通,也就是“廉价谈话”。简单的谈话在实际的经济活动中起着很大的作用,但在大多数经济模型中并不起作用。这项拟议的研究将发展没有调解人的面对面交流的理论模型,强调多轮信息交流的作用。还将考虑为具有多个私下知情方和多轮沟通的游戏制定廉价谈话完善标准。这些分析很重要,因为它们将有助于我们在沟通中的两个问题上加深理解,即由代理发送的交互信号和由人传达的面对面且无成本的沟通。
英文摘要
This research is on communication and has two parts. Part one concerns costly signaling by multiple parties. With few exceptions, signaling has been modeled as a game with one informed sender. This is inappropriate for situations with multiple informed parties. For example, industry insiders tend to have better information about their industry or each other's products than do outsiders, and many of their actions, such as pricing, investment, or advertising choices, are separably observed by the outsiders. Such senders "compete" in the signaling domain to influence the beliefs of receivers. This research will develop models of signaling competition in correlated private information settings. A central focus will be on the conditions under which signaling competition reduces asymmetric information losses. Part two concerns communication which is not costly, "cheap talk." Simple talking plays a large role in actual economic activity, but it plays no role in most economic models. The proposed research will develop theoretical models of face-to-face communication without mediators, emphasizing the role of multiple rounds of message exchange. Cheap talk refinement criteria for games with multiple privately informed parties and multiple rounds of communication will also be considered. These analyses are important because they will help advance our understanding in two issues in communication, namely, interacting signals sent by agents, and face-to-face and costless communication conveyed by people.
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会议论文
The Theory of Dynamic Public Investment Games
  • 批准号:
    0079352
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing grant
  • 资助金额:
    $0.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2000
  • 负责人:
    Steven Matthews
  • 依托单位:
Dynamic Joint Decisions: Free-Riding, Multi-Issue Bargaining, and Contract Revision
  • 批准号:
    9796279
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing grant
  • 资助金额:
    $0.0万
  • 财政年份:
    1997
  • 负责人:
    Steven Matthews
  • 依托单位:
Dynamic Joint Decisions: Free-Riding, Multi-Issue Bargaining, and Contract Revision
  • 批准号:
    9511953
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $6.14万
  • 财政年份:
    1995
  • 负责人:
    Steven Matthews
  • 依托单位:
Play Communication and the Consequences of Imitation
  • 批准号:
    8810615
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $7.9万
  • 财政年份:
    1988
  • 负责人:
    Steven Matthews
  • 依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
植物源烟水对丹参次生代谢产物积累的影响及“smoke signals”机制研究
  • 批准号:
    81673527
  • 项目类别:
    面上项目
  • 资助金额:
    62.0万元
  • 批准年份:
    2016
  • 负责人:
    周洁
  • 依托单位: