Interacting Signals and Cheap Talk Games

本研究是关于沟通的，分为两部分。 第一部分 涉及多方的昂贵信令。 除了少数 例外情况下，信号已被建模为一个游戏， 发送者。 这不适用于具有多个 知情人士。 例如，业内人士往往有 更好地了解他们的行业或彼此的产品 他们的许多行为，比如定价， 投资，或广告的选择，是分开观察， 外人 这种酶在信号传导域中“竞争”， 影响受众的信念。 这项研究将发展 相关私人信息中的信号传递竞争模型 设置. 一个中心重点将是在何种条件下， 信令竞争减少了不对称信息损失。 第二部分是关于不花钱的沟通，“廉价的谈话。" 简单的谈话在实际经济活动中发挥着重要作用， 它在大多数经济模型中不起作用。 拟议研究 将开发面对面交流的理论模型 没有调解人，强调多轮谈判的作用， 信息交换 廉价谈话细化标准的游戏， 多个私下知情方和多轮 沟通也将被考虑。 这些分析很重要，因为它们将有助于推动我们的 理解在两个问题上的沟通，即互动 代理商发出的信号，以及面对面和无成本的沟通 由人传达。

This research is on communication and has two parts. Part one concerns costly signaling by multiple parties. With few exceptions, signaling has been modeled as a game with one informed sender. This is inappropriate for situations with multiple informed parties. For example, industry insiders tend to have better information about their industry or each other's products than do outsiders, and many of their actions, such as pricing, investment, or advertising choices, are separably observed by the outsiders. Such senders "compete" in the signaling domain to influence the beliefs of receivers. This research will develop models of signaling competition in correlated private information settings. A central focus will be on the conditions under which signaling competition reduces asymmetric information losses. Part two concerns communication which is not costly, "cheap talk." Simple talking plays a large role in actual economic activity, but it plays no role in most economic models. The proposed research will develop theoretical models of face-to-face communication without mediators, emphasizing the role of multiple rounds of message exchange. Cheap talk refinement criteria for games with multiple privately informed parties and multiple rounds of communication will also be considered. These analyses are important because they will help advance our understanding in two issues in communication, namely, interacting signals sent by agents, and face-to-face and costless communication conveyed by people.