Interacting Signals and Cheap Talk Games

这项研究是关于传播的，有两个部分。 第一部分涉及多方发出昂贵的信号。 除了少数例外，信令被建模为与一个知情的发送者进行的游戏。 这对于多个知情方的情况是不合适的。 例如，行业内部人士往往比外部人士更了解其行业或彼此的产品，并且他们的许多行为，例如定价、投资或广告选择，都受到外部人士的单独观察。 这些发送者在信令域中“竞争”以影响接收者的信念。 这项研究将开发相关私人信息环境中的信号竞争模型。 一个中心焦点将是信令竞争减少不对称信息损失的条件。 第二部分涉及成本不高的沟通，即“廉价的谈话”。 简单的谈话在实际经济活动中发挥着重要作用，但在大多数经济模型中却不起任何作用。 拟议的研究将开发无中介的面对面交流的理论模型，强调多轮消息交换的作用。 还将考虑针对多个私人知情方和多轮沟通的博弈的廉价谈话细化标准。 这些分析很重要，因为它们将有助于增进我们对沟通中两个问题的理解，即代理发送的交互信号，以及人们传达的面对面且无成本的沟通。

This research is on communication and has two parts. Part one concerns costly signaling by multiple parties. With few exceptions, signaling has been modeled as a game with one informed sender. This is inappropriate for situations with multiple informed parties. For example, industry insiders tend to have better information about their industry or each other's products than do outsiders, and many of their actions, such as pricing, investment, or advertising choices, are separably observed by the outsiders. Such senders "compete" in the signaling domain to influence the beliefs of receivers. This research will develop models of signaling competition in correlated private information settings. A central focus will be on the conditions under which signaling competition reduces asymmetric information losses. Part two concerns communication which is not costly, "cheap talk." Simple talking plays a large role in actual economic activity, but it plays no role in most economic models. The proposed research will develop theoretical models of face-to-face communication without mediators, emphasizing the role of multiple rounds of message exchange. Cheap talk refinement criteria for games with multiple privately informed parties and multiple rounds of communication will also be considered. These analyses are important because they will help advance our understanding in two issues in communication, namely, interacting signals sent by agents, and face-to-face and costless communication conveyed by people.