Interacting Signals and Cheap Talk Games

本研究是关于传播学的，分为两个部分。第一部分涉及多方昂贵的信号。除了少数例外，信号被建模为只有一个知情的发送者的游戏。这不适用于有多个知情方的情况。例如，业内人士往往比外部人士更了解他们的行业或彼此的产品，他们的许多行为，如定价、投资或广告选择，都是由外部人士单独观察到的。这些发送者在信号域“竞争”以影响接收者的信念。本研究将开发相关私人信息环境下的信号竞争模型。重点将放在信号竞争减少不对称信息损失的条件上。第二部分涉及沟通，这是不昂贵的，“廉价的谈话”。简单的谈话在实际的经济活动中起着很大的作用，但在大多数经济模型中不起作用。本研究将建立无中介的面对面沟通理论模型，强调多轮信息交换的作用。对于拥有多个知情方和多轮沟通的游戏，我们也会考虑廉价谈话的改进标准。这些分析很重要，因为它们将有助于我们加深对沟通中的两个问题的理解，即代理发出的交互信号和人传达的面对面和无成本的沟通。

This research is on communication and has two parts. Part one concerns costly signaling by multiple parties. With few exceptions, signaling has been modeled as a game with one informed sender. This is inappropriate for situations with multiple informed parties. For example, industry insiders tend to have better information about their industry or each other's products than do outsiders, and many of their actions, such as pricing, investment, or advertising choices, are separably observed by the outsiders. Such senders "compete" in the signaling domain to influence the beliefs of receivers. This research will develop models of signaling competition in correlated private information settings. A central focus will be on the conditions under which signaling competition reduces asymmetric information losses. Part two concerns communication which is not costly, "cheap talk." Simple talking plays a large role in actual economic activity, but it plays no role in most economic models. The proposed research will develop theoretical models of face-to-face communication without mediators, emphasizing the role of multiple rounds of message exchange. Cheap talk refinement criteria for games with multiple privately informed parties and multiple rounds of communication will also be considered. These analyses are important because they will help advance our understanding in two issues in communication, namely, interacting signals sent by agents, and face-to-face and costless communication conveyed by people.