Play Communication and the Consequences of Imitation
游戏交流和模仿的后果
基本信息
- 批准号:8810615
- 负责人:
- 金额:$ 7.9万
- 依托单位:
- 依托单位国家:美国
- 项目类别:Continuing Grant
- 财政年份:1988
- 资助国家:美国
- 起止时间:1988-08-15 至 1991-07-31
- 项目状态:已结题
- 来源:
- 关键词:
项目摘要
The introduction of information acquisition and information processing into economic models of decision making was a major breakthrough in the realism and the relevance of economics. The paradigm of information economics provided new insights in almost every area of economic research. One currently popular model treats economic agents with private information as games of incomplete information. Such models have penetrated most fields of economics, falling under the rubrics of signalling, screening, sorting, adverse selection, and mechanism design. Very few of these applied models allow agents to talk to each other, despite the obvious prevalence of conversation and other types of communication in reality. The central premise of this project is that communication should be explicitly incorporated in a game-theoretic way into economic models. Some of this research is in the context of two applications. The first consists of voting-political situations in which speechmaking plays an important role; the goal is to rationalize the role of political rhetoric. The second application is to bilateral trading, studying the effect of communication between traders whose preferences are private information on resource allocation. The double auction is taken as the prototype trading institution. The project also develops a novel approach to bounded rationality. Introspection tells us that the knowledge, computational powers, and complexity of the strategies assumed of individuals in economic models is beyond realistic belief. But rational choice models have not been displaced by alternatives because rational choice models perform well and the alternative models are descriptive and invariably break down. The model developed in this project differs from past work in that bounds are imposed on the individual's ability to compute, rather than on the complexity of the strategies. The key assumption of this model is that a boundedly rational individual confronted by circumstances for which he cannot, at the present time, calculate an optimal action for himself, will imitate others. Both of these lines of research are very exciting. Preliminary work shows that existing bargaining models can make seriously wrong predictions by ignoring pre-play communications. This project would correct the biases in these widely used economic models. The development of a tractable formal theory of bounded rationality would be a major breakthrough in economics. This new theory could explain some of the empirical problems with models that assume completely rational behavior by economic agents.
将信息获取和信息处理引入决策的经济模型,是经济学现实性和相关性的重大突破。信息经济学的范式在几乎所有经济研究领域都提供了新的见解。目前流行的一种模型将拥有私人信息的经济代理人视为不完全信息的游戏。这类模型已渗透到经济学的大多数领域,属于信号传递、筛选、分类、逆向选择和机制设计的范畴。这些应用的模型中很少允许代理相互交谈,尽管现实中对话和其他类型的通信显然很普遍。这个项目的中心前提是,沟通应该以博弈论的方式明确地纳入经济模型。其中一些研究是在两个应用的背景下进行的。第一种是投票政治情况,演讲在其中发挥重要作用;目标是使政治修辞的作用合理化。第二个应用于双边交易,研究了偏好为资源配置私人信息的交易者之间沟通的效果。以双向拍卖作为交易制度的雏形。该项目还开发了一种新的有限理性方法。自省告诉我们,在经济模型中,个人假设的策略的知识、计算能力和复杂性超出了现实的相信。但理性选择模型没有被替代模型取代,因为理性选择模型表现良好,而替代模型是描述性的,总是会崩溃。这个项目中开发的模型与过去的工作不同,因为界限施加在个人的计算能力上,而不是策略的复杂性上。这个模型的关键假设是,一个有限理性的个体在面对他目前无法为自己计算出最优行动的情况时,会模仿他人。这两条研究路线都非常令人兴奋。初步工作表明,现有的讨价还价模型可能会通过忽略玩前交流而做出严重错误的预测。这个项目将纠正这些广泛使用的经济模型中的偏见。发展一种易于处理的形式上的有限理性理论,将是经济学的一大突破。这一新理论可以用假设经济主体完全理性行为的模型来解释一些经验问题。
项目成果
期刊论文数量(0)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
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Steven Matthews其他文献
First report of agglomerated and sintered carbide-high-entropy alloy composite thermal spray coating
团聚烧结碳化物-高熵合金复合热喷涂涂层的首次报道
- DOI:
10.1016/j.scriptamat.2025.116591 - 发表时间:
2025-04-15 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:5.600
- 作者:
Ecio Bosi;Ashok Meghwal;Mehdi Hourmand;Surinder Singh;Michael Boschen;Anthony Roccisano;Colin Hall;Steven Matthews;Paul Munroe;Christopher C. Berndt;Andrew Siao Ming Ang - 通讯作者:
Andrew Siao Ming Ang
An Accountable Care Organization (ACO) and an Academic Medical Center's Palliative Care Team Address Workforce Needs by Integrating Care Coordinators to Assist with Hospice Referrals in an Acute Care Setting (S733)
- DOI:
10.1016/j.jpainsymman.2014.11.214 - 发表时间:
2015-02-01 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:
- 作者:
James Fausto;M. Alexander Alvarez;Antonia Gupta;Barbara Healy;Steven Matthews - 通讯作者:
Steven Matthews
Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Boston Library Consortium Iviember Libraries of Economics Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation Nvimber 367
2011 年,在波士顿图书馆联盟的资助下,互联网档案馆进行了数字化。 Iviember 经济学图书馆 不完整合同和重新谈判 Nvimber 367
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
2011 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
O. Hart;John. Moore;Steven Matthews;Garth Saloner;José A. Scheinkman - 通讯作者:
José A. Scheinkman
R eport on BCTCS 2009
2009 年 BCTCS 报告
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
2023 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
A. Czumaj;Sara Kalvala;Steven Matthews;Alistair Sinclair;J. Hillston - 通讯作者:
J. Hillston
Respecting Agency in Dementia Care: When Should Truthfulness Give Way?
在痴呆症护理中尊重机构:什么时候应该放弃诚实?
- DOI:
10.1111/japp.12541 - 发表时间:
2021 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:1.1
- 作者:
Steven Matthews;J. Kennett - 通讯作者:
J. Kennett
Steven Matthews的其他文献
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{{ truncateString('Steven Matthews', 18)}}的其他基金
The Theory of Dynamic Public Investment Games
动态公共投资博弈理论
- 批准号:
0079352 - 财政年份:2000
- 资助金额:
$ 7.9万 - 项目类别:
Continuing grant
Dynamic Joint Decisions: Free-Riding, Multi-Issue Bargaining, and Contract Revision
动态联合决策:搭便车、多问题讨价还价和合同修改
- 批准号:
9796279 - 财政年份:1997
- 资助金额:
$ 7.9万 - 项目类别:
Continuing grant
Dynamic Joint Decisions: Free-Riding, Multi-Issue Bargaining, and Contract Revision
动态联合决策:搭便车、多问题讨价还价和合同修改
- 批准号:
9511953 - 财政年份:1995
- 资助金额:
$ 7.9万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant
Interacting Signals and Cheap Talk Games
交互信号和廉价的谈话游戏
- 批准号:
9111249 - 财政年份:1991
- 资助金额:
$ 7.9万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Strategic Acquisition and Communication of Information
信息的战略获取和沟通
- 批准号:
8410157 - 财政年份:1984
- 资助金额:
$ 7.9万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Risk Aversion, Differential Information, and Learning in Oligopolies
风险规避、差异信息和寡头垄断中的学习
- 批准号:
8107103 - 财政年份:1981
- 资助金额:
$ 7.9万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
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