Play Communication and the Consequences of Imitation

信息采集与信息导入 决策的经济模型是一个主要的 在现实主义和经济学相关性上的突破。 的 信息经济学范式提供了新的见解， 经济研究的各个领域。 目前流行的一种模式 将拥有私人信息的经济主体视为 不完整的信息。 这种模式已经渗透到大多数领域 经济学，属于信号，筛选， 排序、逆向选择和机制设计。 很少 这些应用模型允许代理相互交谈， 谈话和其他类型的 现实中的沟通。 本项目的中心前提是，沟通应 以博弈论的方式， 模型 其中一些研究是在两个 应用. 第一种是投票政治情况 演讲在其中扮演着重要的角色;目标是 合理化政治修辞的作用。 第二 应用是双边贸易，研究的影响， 偏好是私人的交易者之间的通信 资源分配信息。 双向拍卖成交 as the prototype原型trading贸易institution机构. 该项目还开发了一种新颖的方法， 理性 内省告诉我们，知识， 计算能力，以及假设的策略的复杂性， 经济模型中的个人是超越现实的信念。 但 理性选择模型并没有被替代品所取代 因为理性选择模型表现良好， 模型是描述性的，总是会崩溃。 模型 在这个项目中开发的不同于过去的工作，在这一界限 是强加于个人的计算能力，而不是 战略的复杂性。 这个问题的关键假设是 模型是一个有限理性的个体面对 他目前无法计算的情况 一个对自己最有利的行为，就会模仿别人。 这两条研究路线都非常令人兴奋。 初步 研究表明，现有的谈判模型可以使严重的 错误的预测，忽略了赛前的沟通。 这 该项目将纠正这些广泛使用的经济学中的偏见， 模型 一个易处理的有界形式理论的发展 理性将是经济学的重大突破。 这个新 理论可以解释模型的一些经验问题 假设经济主体的行为是完全理性的

The introduction of information acquisition and information processing into economic models of decision making was a major breakthrough in the realism and the relevance of economics. The paradigm of information economics provided new insights in almost every area of economic research. One currently popular model treats economic agents with private information as games of incomplete information. Such models have penetrated most fields of economics, falling under the rubrics of signalling, screening, sorting, adverse selection, and mechanism design. Very few of these applied models allow agents to talk to each other, despite the obvious prevalence of conversation and other types of communication in reality. The central premise of this project is that communication should be explicitly incorporated in a game-theoretic way into economic models. Some of this research is in the context of two applications. The first consists of voting-political situations in which speechmaking plays an important role; the goal is to rationalize the role of political rhetoric. The second application is to bilateral trading, studying the effect of communication between traders whose preferences are private information on resource allocation. The double auction is taken as the prototype trading institution. The project also develops a novel approach to bounded rationality. Introspection tells us that the knowledge, computational powers, and complexity of the strategies assumed of individuals in economic models is beyond realistic belief. But rational choice models have not been displaced by alternatives because rational choice models perform well and the alternative models are descriptive and invariably break down. The model developed in this project differs from past work in that bounds are imposed on the individual's ability to compute, rather than on the complexity of the strategies. The key assumption of this model is that a boundedly rational individual confronted by circumstances for which he cannot, at the present time, calculate an optimal action for himself, will imitate others. Both of these lines of research are very exciting. Preliminary work shows that existing bargaining models can make seriously wrong predictions by ignoring pre-play communications. This project would correct the biases in these widely used economic models. The development of a tractable formal theory of bounded rationality would be a major breakthrough in economics. This new theory could explain some of the empirical problems with models that assume completely rational behavior by economic agents.