The Theory of Dynamic Public Investment Games
The Theory of Dynamic Public Investment Games
批准号:
0079352
负责人:
Steven Matthews
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing grant
财政年份:
2000
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2000-07-15 至 2004-06-30
中文摘要
该项目发展了一种动态公共投资博弈理论。这些游戏旨在模拟动态环境,在这种环境中,当前的行动具有不可逆转地改变未来激励的外部效应。一个典型的例子是为提供资金而发起的基金活动,这些资金将产生未来的公共利益,比如公共电视节目或新的教堂建筑群。这种公共投资博弈的重要特征是:(1)个人的贡献(通常是积极的)影响所有其他参与者;(2)这种利益是不可逆转的,假设捐款是不可退还的;(3)这种贡献通过扩大未来捐赠者将贡献的公共产品的金额来改变他们的激励。具有类似特征的环境,因此可以从公共投资博弈的角度来看待,比起仅仅是慈善基金活动,它要普遍得多。它们包括以下内容。寡头垄断中的公司随着时间的推移投资于自己的资本存量,从而通过其对边际成本的影响而增长并影响所有公司,从而影响价格。在没有第三方执行协议的情况下进行讨价还价,就像在关于贸易、和平或减少污染的条约的国际谈判中那样,往往是随着时间的推移零碎地进行,未来的让步取决于早先采取的肯定步骤。随着时间的推移,游说者向立法者支付的款项产生了一系列公共产品,这就是立法结果。在专利竞赛中,一家公司目前的研发支出不可逆转地影响着对一项创新的了解程度,这将影响到所有公司。在战略学习环境中,代理人当前行动的结果为所有代理人提供了信息外部性,不可逆转地改变了信念,从而产生了未来的激励。因此,非常抽象地,动态公共投资博弈旨在模拟通过个人努力、投资、贡献或其他可以随时间递增的影响活动而创造的任何情况。本研究对这种动态博弈给出了适当的一般定义。它尽可能地刻画了这些博弈的序列均衡,目标是获得在完备性上与我们现在重复博弈的结果相媲美的结果。总体目标是增加我们对这些环境的理解,并就如何改变这些环境提供指导,例如,通过修改游说、专利或慈善活动的治理。需要解决的中心问题涉及这些环境表现出的搭便车和协调失误造成的低效率。
英文摘要
The project develops a theory of dynamic public investment games. These games are intended to model dynamic environments in which current actions have external effects that irreversibly alter future incentives. A canonical example is a fund drive to provide the capital that will produce a future public benefit such as public television programming or a new church complex. Important features of such a drive that characterize a public investment game are: (1) an individual's contribution affects (generally positively) all the other participants; (2) this benefit is irreversible, assuming contributions are nonrefundable; and (3) the contribution alters the incentives of future contributors by enlarging the amount of the public good to which they will contribute.Environments with similar features, and which hence may be usefully viewed through the lens of a public investment game, are far more pervasive than just charity fund drives. They include the following. Firms in an oligopoly invest over time in their own capital stocks, which thus grow and affect all firms via their effect on marginal cost and hence prices. Bargaining when there is no third party to enforce agreements, as in international negotiations over trade, peace, or pollution abatement treaties, often takes place piecemeal over time with future concessions depending on the affirmative steps taken at earlier dates. Payments made over time by lobbyists to legislators generate a bundle of public goods, the legislative outcomes. In a patent race, a firm's current R&D expenditures irreversibly affect the state of knowledge about an innovation that will affect all firms. In a strategic learning environment, the result of an agent's current action provides an informational externality to all agents, irreversibly changing beliefs and hence future incentives. Thus, very abstractly, a dynamic public investment game is intended to model any situation in which "social capital" is created by individual efforts, investments, contributions, or other influence activities that can be taken incrementally over time.This research formulates an appropriate general definition of such dynamic games. It characterizes as much as possible the sequential equilibria of these games, with the goal being to obtain results that rival in completeness those we now have for repeated games. The overall goal is to increase our understanding of these environments, and to provide guidance for how to alter them, e.g., by modifying the governance of lobbying, patents, or charity drives. The central issues to be addressed concern the inefficiencies caused by free riding and coordination failure that these environments exhibit.
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会议论文
Dynamic Joint Decisions: Free-Riding, Multi-Issue Bargaining, and Contract Revision
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批准号:9796279
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项目类别:Continuing grant
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资助金额:$0.0万
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财政年份:1997
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负责人:Steven Matthews
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依托单位:
Dynamic Joint Decisions: Free-Riding, Multi-Issue Bargaining, and Contract Revision
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批准号:9511953
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$6.14万
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财政年份:1995
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负责人:Steven Matthews
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依托单位:
Interacting Signals and Cheap Talk Games
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批准号:9111249
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$8.83万
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财政年份:1991
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负责人:Steven Matthews
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依托单位:
Play Communication and the Consequences of Imitation
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批准号:8810615
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$7.9万
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财政年份:1988
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负责人:Steven Matthews
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依托单位:
Strategic Acquisition and Communication of Information
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批准号:8410157
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$8.95万
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财政年份:1984
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负责人:Steven Matthews
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依托单位:
Risk Aversion, Differential Information, and Learning in Oligopolies
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批准号:8107103
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$2.63万
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财政年份:1981
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负责人:Steven Matthews
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依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Dynamic Credit Rating with Feedback Effects
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批准号:--
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项目类别:外国学者研究基金项目
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资助金额:--
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批准年份:2024
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负责人:Christian Martin Hilpert
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依托单位: