Dynamic Joint Decisions: Free-Riding, Multi-Issue Bargaining, and Contract Revision

史蒂文·马修斯西北大学SBR-9511953该提案包括三个相关项目，重点是修订合同和有意安排协议和行动的顺序。第一个项目考察了一种假设，即当合同无法执行时，各方可能需要随着时间的推移采取零敲碎打的行动。这一想法的一个应用涉及到自愿为公共利益捐款的经典案例。如果贡献者必须同时捐款，那么唯一的均衡结果是没有捐款，因为每个人都试图“搭便车”。但如果个人能够随着时间的推移分配他们的贡献，通常会存在一个均衡，在这种平衡中，在有限的时间内做出全部贡献。这项研究将探索这一结果对所做假设的稳健性。第二个项目着眼于当并非所有行动都可收缩时的多问题讨价还价。同样，我们的目标是理解为什么合同协议往往是以零敲碎打的方式达成的，而目前的模型预测，一切都应该在一开始就进行谈判，不能有任何拖延。第三个项目涉及合同协议的演变。提出了一个模型，该模型认为，在合同受有限责任约束的委托代理模型中，均衡的初始合同以简单债务的形式存在，然后再重新谈判。

Steven Matthews Northwestern University SBR-9511953 The proposal consists of three related projects centered on the revision of contracts and the intentional sequencing of agreements and actions. The first project examines the hypothesis that when contracts cannot be enforced, then the parties may need to take actions piecemeal over time. One application of this idea concerns the classic case of voluntary contributions to a public good. If contributors have to give at the same time, then the only equilibrium results in no contributions being given as everyone tries to "free-ride." But if individuals can spread out their contributions over time, in general an equilibrium will exist in which full contributions are made in finite time. The research will explore the robustness of this result to the underlying assumptions made. The second project looks at multi-issue bargaining when not all actions are contractible. Again the goal is to understand why contractual agreements are often reached in piecemeal fashion, when current models predict that everything should be negotiated at the beginning with no delay. The third project concerns the evolution of contractual agreements. A model is presented that suggests that in a principal-agent model in which contracts are contrained by limited liability, the equiibrium initial contract takes the form of simple debt which is later renegotiated.