Applying Strategic Bargaining Models to Union Contract Negotiations

本研究的目的是开发并实证检验适用于工会合同谈判的策略议价模型。合同数据的一个突出特征是罢工：在合同到期后，谈判通常在没有罢工的情况下继续进行。根据到期的合同支付工人工资，生产继续进行。开发了一个模型来解释工会的威胁选择。该模型的一个关键预测是，罢工发生率的变化是由纠纷构成的变化引起的。罢工活动随着经济和政策变量的变化而变化，这些变量会改变罢工威胁相对于不参与威胁的吸引力。初步的实证结果普遍支持这一预测。还有一些证据表明，1981年以后的谈判发生了结构性转变。该项目将以这些初步结果为基础。首先，对实证检验的数据进行补充和完善。其次，将开发和实施包含该理论主要特征的估计策略。第三，将研究永久性罢工替代问题。特别是将讨论长期替代人员在1981年以后谈判的结构转变中所起的作用。对替代罢工工人的理论和实证分析将加剧当前关于企业是否应该永久替代罢工工人的政策辩论。

The aim of this project is to develop and empirically test strategic bargaining models applied to union contract negotiations. A prominent feature of the contract data is the holdout: negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired. Production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract. A model was developed that accounts for the union's threat choice. A key prediction of the model is that variation in strike incidence is caused by shifts in the composition of disputes. Strike activity varies with economic and policy variables that change the attractiveness of the strike threat relative to the holdout threat. Preliminary empirical results generally support this prediction. Also there is some evidence of a structural shift in negotiations after 1981. This project will build on these preliminary results. First, the data for empirical tests will be added to and refined. Second, estimation strategies that incorporate the main features of the theory will be developed and implemented. Third, the issue of permanent strike replacements will be studied. In particular, the role that permanent replacements played in the structural shift in negotiations after 1981 will be addressed. A theoretical and empirical analysis of strike replacements will add to the current policy debate on whether firms should be able to permanently replace striking workers.