Strategic Information in Bargaining and Contracting

有许多模型描述讨价还价行为， 在不确定的结果面前解决冲突。 这 研究将使用实验室实验方法来评估 两种替代讨价还价模型的预测能力 一个不完整的合同。 以最简单的形式， 不完全合同第一阶段的当事人首先作出 某种形式的关系特定投资，提高价值 或者在第二阶段降低成本，当不确定性 解决了 一旦了解了世界的状况， 不完全契约实现了剩余分配， 参与者 讨价还价分割剩余并完成 合同 子博弈完美均衡讨价还价假说 预测来自讨价还价的剩余分配是独立的 沉没成本，即，在本例中，特定于关系 投资. 或者，一个股权理论模型预测， 讨价还价将按比例分配剩余 当个别投资是 可观察的 当没有这些信息时， 与完美均衡预测的结果相当 假说. 这些可供选择的谈判假设的预测能力 将通过系统地改变议价者的信息进行测试 关系型投资 此外，由于投资 合同中的激励是由谈判结果决定的， 由于要测试的假设意味着不同的讨价还价 结果，这项研究也将有助于我们了解 讨价还价行为与契约的联系 性能

There are a number of models describing bargaining behavior and conflict resolution in the face of uncertain outcomes. This study will use laboratory experimental methods to evaluate the predictive capacity of two alternative models of bargaining in the context of an incomplete contract. In its most simple form, parties in the first stage of an incomplete contract first make some form of relationship-specific investment that enhances value or reduces costs in the second stage, when uncertainty is resolved. Once the state of the world is known, parties to the incomplete contract realize a surplus to be divided among participants. Bargaining divides surplus and completes the contract. The subgame perfect equilibrium bargaining hypothesis predicts that surplus divisions from bargaining are independent of sunk costs, i.e., in this case, relationship-specific investments. Alternatively, an equity-theoretic model predicts that bargaining will divide surplus proportionately with each party's share of total investment when individual investments are observable. When this information is not available, outcomes are equivalent to those predicted by the perfect equilibrium hypothesis. The predictive power of these alternative bargaining hypotheses will be tested by systematically varying bargainers' information on relationship-specific investments. Moreover, since investment incentives in contracts are determined by bargaining outcomes, and since the hypotheses to be tested imply different bargaining outcomes, this study will also contribute to our understanding of the linkage between bargaining behavior and contractual performance.