The Persistence of Trust: Further Tests of the Cooperators'Advantage

信任的持久性：进一步考验合作者的优势

• 批准号: 9208534
• 负责人: John Orbell
• 金额: $ 10.32万
• 依托单位: University of Oregon Eugene
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1992
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1992-07-15 至 1994-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9208534&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Persistence; Trust; Further; Tests; Cooperators

In many problems of shared resources, often termed "public goods," or problems where the decision outcome of one person depends highly on the behavior of others, important research questions arise about the nature of trust and cooperative or defective behavior. In such situations, cooperation works to the advantage of the group but individuals are privately better off not cooperating. Experimental evidence from games that reflect the conditions of highly interdependent outcomes and optional participation, shows that (1) people who intend cooperation are more willing than defectors to enter into such situations (i.e. to "trust"); (2) cooperators are relatively more successful regarding rewards from the experimental games than the defectors, hence the term, "cooperators' advantage;" and (3) neither intending cooperators nor intending defectors have special capacity to recognize the intentions of strangers, meaning that the cooperators' advantage comes exclusively from the disproportionate probability of participation with other cooperators. This suggests that players decide to participate by a heuristic where they project their own intentions to others. This research will further test the robustness of these results by investigating the effects of experience on the heuristic that gives rise to the cooperators' advantage. Competing hypotheses predict: (1) that repeated "sampling" of partners from the population pool will lead expectations to converge such that the cooperators' advantage is eliminated; or (2) that available samples of others' behavior are biased and provide both intending cooperators and intending defectors with confirming evidence of their original expectations and thus, stimulate little adjustment from experience. These hypotheses will be tested by providing subjects with various types of feedback about the choices of others. The findings will bear on the possibility of cooperation evolving independently of tit-for-tat or other incentive-based mechanisms discussed in the literature.

在许多共享资源（通常被称为“公共产品”）的问题中， 或者是一个人的决策结果高度依赖于 对他人的行为，重要的研究问题出现， 信任和合作或缺陷行为的性质。 以这样 在这种情况下，合作对小组有利，但 个人私下里最好不要合作。 实验 从游戏中得到的证据反映了 相互依存的结果和可选的参与，表明（1） 打算合作的人比叛逃者更愿意 （2）合作者是指： 相对来说，在实验奖励方面， 游戏比背叛者，因此术语，“合作者的优势;” （3）有意合作者和有意叛逃者都没有 识别陌生人意图的特殊能力， 合作者的优势完全来自于 与其他参与者的不成比例的可能性 合作者。 这表明玩家决定参与 一种启发式的方法，让他们把自己的意图投射到别人身上。 这项研究将进一步测试这些结果的鲁棒性， 调查经验对启发式的影响， 对合作者有利。 竞争假说预测： (1)从人口库中重复“抽样”伴侣 将导致期望趋同， （2）其他人的可用样本; 行为是有偏见的，并提供双方有意合作， 打算叛逃者与确认证据，其原来的 期望，因此，刺激很少从经验调整。 这些假设将通过向受试者提供各种 对他人选择的反馈。 其成果将 影响到合作独立发展的可能性， 达特或其他激励机制， 文学