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Collaborative Research on Laboratory Markets with Posted Prices: Discounts, Search Costs, and Demand Shocks

Collaborative Research on Laboratory Markets with Posted Prices: Discounts, Search Costs, and Demand Shocks
对标有价格的实验室市场的合作研究:折扣、搜索成本和需求冲击
批准号:
9320044
负责人:
Charles Holt
金额:
$7.66万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
1994
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1994-04-01 至 1998-03-31

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
9320044霍尔特发布要约交易机构是一家卖家在接受或不接受的基础上发布价格的机构。公布的报价结果提供了与结构较少的双向拍卖实验中的交易进行比较的基础。这个项目的动机是来自发布的实验的三个风格化的事实。第一个涉及明显的价格操纵阴谋,这可能会在实验室发布的报价环境中提高价格。在可比的双向拍卖中,卖家阴谋的无效促使拟议的工作,即出售后市场中的串通是否受到卖家提供私人折扣的机会的破坏。相关实验将考察合同限制对折扣和行业协会报告的影响。第二个程式化的事实是,公开发售市场对需求冲击的反应不佳。这一观察结果的一个含义是,公布价格的过程可能会产生价格刚性,从而导致凯恩斯主义的宏观经济后果。拟议的实验涉及使用法定货币在一般均衡框架内同时公布工资和价格。一个目标是研究名义货币冲击的实际影响。第三个问题来自于发布报价市场普遍较弱的竞争趋势,这表明,添加一些小的缺陷,比如搜索成本,可能会大幅提高价格。拟议的实验将评估这一(“钻石”)悖论的几种最新理论解决方案,即微小的缺陷可以产生垄断价格。
英文摘要
9320044 Holt The posted-offer trading institution is one in which sellers post prices on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Posted-offer results provide a basis of comparison with trading in less structured double-auction experiments. This project is motivated by three stylized facts from posted-offer experiments. The first involves explicit price-fixing conspiracies which can raise prices in laboratory posted-offer settings. The ineffectiveness of seller conspiracies in comparable double-auctions motivates the proposed work on whether collusion in posted-offer markets is undermined by opportunities for sellers to offer private discounts. Related experiments will examine the effects of contractual restrictions on discounting and on trade association reports. A second stylized fact is the poor response of posted-offer markets to demand shocks. One implication of this observation is that the price-posting process could generate price rigidities with Keynesian macroeconomic consequences. The proposed experiments involve simultaneous posting of wages and prices in a general equilibrium framework with fiat money. One goal is to study the real effects of nominal monetary shocks. The third issue arises from the generally weak competitive tendencies of posted-offer markets which suggest that prices might be raised sharply by the addition of small imperfections, such as search costs. The proposed experiments will evaluate several recent theoretical resolutions of this ("Diamond") paradox, i.e., that small imperfections can produce monopoly prices.
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Auction Design for Allocating Allowances and Licenses: Consignment and Price Containment Mechanisms
  • 批准号:
    1459918
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $14.83万
  • 财政年份:
    2015
  • 负责人:
    Charles Holt
  • 依托单位:
NSCC/SA: Collaborative Research: Experimental Analysis of Alternative Models of Conflict Bargaining
  • 批准号:
    0904795
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $13.75万
  • 财政年份:
    2009
  • 负责人:
    Charles Holt
  • 依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: An Experimental Analysis of Settlement Delay in Tort Litigation
  • 批准号:
    0922513
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $1.2万
  • 财政年份:
    2009
  • 负责人:
    Charles Holt
  • 依托单位:
Collaborative Research: NSCC/SA: Behavioral Insights into National Security Issues
  • 批准号:
    0904798
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $4.15万
  • 财政年份:
    2009
  • 负责人:
    Charles Holt
  • 依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Research on Quantum Field Theory without a Lagrangian Description
  • 批准号:
    24ZR1403900
  • 项目类别:
    省市级项目
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 批准年份:
    2024
  • 负责人:
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  • 依托单位:
Cell Research
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