Collaborative Research on Laboratory Markets with Posted Prices: Discounts, Search Costs, and Demand Shocks

对标有价格的实验室市场的合作研究：折扣、搜索成本和需求冲击

• 批准号: 9320044
• 负责人: Charles Holt
• 金额: $ 7.66万
• 依托单位: University of Virginia Main Campus
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1994
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1994-04-01 至 1998-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9320044&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Laboratory; Markets; Posted

9320044 Holt The posted-offer trading institution is one in which sellers post prices on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Posted-offer results provide a basis of comparison with trading in less structured double-auction experiments. This project is motivated by three stylized facts from posted-offer experiments. The first involves explicit price-fixing conspiracies which can raise prices in laboratory posted-offer settings. The ineffectiveness of seller conspiracies in comparable double-auctions motivates the proposed work on whether collusion in posted-offer markets is undermined by opportunities for sellers to offer private discounts. Related experiments will examine the effects of contractual restrictions on discounting and on trade association reports. A second stylized fact is the poor response of posted-offer markets to demand shocks. One implication of this observation is that the price-posting process could generate price rigidities with Keynesian macroeconomic consequences. The proposed experiments involve simultaneous posting of wages and prices in a general equilibrium framework with fiat money. One goal is to study the real effects of nominal monetary shocks. The third issue arises from the generally weak competitive tendencies of posted-offer markets which suggest that prices might be raised sharply by the addition of small imperfections, such as search costs. The proposed experiments will evaluate several recent theoretical resolutions of this ("Diamond") paradox, i.e., that small imperfections can produce monopoly prices.

9320044霍尔特后报价交易机构是卖方在接受或放弃的基础上发布价格的机构。 发布的报价结果提供了一个基础上的比较与交易结构较少的双向拍卖实验。 这个项目的动机是三个程式化的事实后提供实验。 第一种涉及明确的价格操纵阴谋，这种阴谋可以在实验室发布的报价设置中提高价格。 卖方合谋在可比的双重拍卖的无效性，激励拟议的工作是否串通后的报价市场被破坏的机会，卖方提供私人折扣。 相关的实验将研究合同限制对贴现和贸易协会报告的影响。 第二个典型的事实是，后要约市场对需求冲击的反应很差。 这一观察结果的一个含义是，价格公布过程可能产生具有凯恩斯宏观经济后果的价格刚性。 拟议中的实验涉及在一般均衡框架下用法定货币同时公布工资和价格。 目标之一是研究名义货币冲击的真实的影响。 第三个问题产生于报价后市场普遍较弱的竞争趋势，这表明，价格可能会因增加一些小的缺陷而急剧上升，如搜索成本。 拟议的实验将评估这个（“钻石”）悖论的几个最近的理论解决方案，即，微小的缺陷会产生垄断价格。