Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: An Experimental Study of Exclusive Contracts

一个健康的国民经济在一定程度上是靠企业之间的竞争来提高效率的。社会福利因缺乏竞争而减少的情况需要进行明确和彻底的调查。买方和卖方之间的排他性合同就是其中一种情况，理论上已经证明，这种情况有可能阻碍竞争，并通过阻止进入而降低效率。本项目使用实验方法来研究围绕一种排他性合同的效率后果和政策影响，这种合同通常被称为“裸排除”，它限制签署的买方只能从特定的卖方那里购买。关于这些类型的排他性合同是否曾被用于反竞争的方式，学术界一直存在争论。利用数学模型和直觉观察，一些理论家已经证明，在某些情况下，阻止提高效率的进入是有利可图的，而且是成功的。这个项目将理论模型的各个方面带到一个环境中，在这个环境中，有财务动机的个人做出的决定会以与确定公司利润相同的方式影响收益。实验的使用提供了一种自然的方法来检查各种市场条件下的实际行为，同时以加强控制和促进复制的形式提供优势。因此，该项目提供了一种理想的方法来测试现有的理论，使用人类受试者的决策，同时增加了稀缺的数据，并补充了相对有限的实证工作。这些实验是利用一个新的在线程序进行的，基于现有理论文献的结构，这些理论文献描述了这样一种情况：面对潜在的竞争对手卖家的进入，现任垄断者可以选择向每个愿意签署排他性合同的买家提供一定的金额。除了测试行为对理论预测的依从性之外，不同处理之间的比较还测试了各种市场条件的影响，例如同时与顺序的买家决策，买家数量和买家沟通对观察阻止进入和降低效率的可能性的影响。然后将结果应用于确定具有特定市场特征的现实行业中的排他性合同是否可能无效地限制竞争。此外，该实验室允许本科生和具有商业经验的MBA学生进行复制。更广泛的影响这项研究对社会的好处包括更好地理解排他性合同的潜在有害影响以及其发生可能性的决定因素。这可能会影响反垄断政策，或者更具体地说，它可能会对某些反垄断诉讼的评估方式产生影响（即，它们是否对消费者和社会造成非法损害）。此外，实验结果的分析将以博士论文的形式发布，数据和在线程序将向公众开放。这不仅允许其他人在这一领域进行进一步的实验研究，而且该程序也可以用作教学工具。将实验用于课堂教学将是一个令人兴奋和互动的方式，让学生了解独家合同。

A healthy national economy is sustained in part by the ability of competition to induce efficiency among firms. Circumstances in which the welfare of a society is reduced by a lack of competition warrant an explicit and thorough investigation. Exclusive contracts between buyers and sellers are one of these situations that has been theoretically shown to have the potential to hinder competition and decrease efficiency through deterred entry. This project uses experimental methods to examine the efficiency consequences and policy implications surrounding a type of exclusive contract, often referred to as a naked exclusion, which restricts the signed buyer to purchase solely from a specific seller.There has been a scholarly debate as to whether these types of exclusive contracts are ever used in an anticompetitive fashion. Using mathematical models and intuitive observations, some theorists have demonstrated that efficiency-enhancing entry can profitably and successfully be deterred under certain circumstances. This project takes aspects of the theoretical models to a setting where financially motivated individuals make decisions that affect earnings in the same way firm profits are determined. The use of experiments provides a natural way to examine actual behavior under various market conditions while affording advantages in the form of enhanced control and facilitated replication. This project thus provides an ideal way to test the existing theory using the decisions of human subjects while adding to the scarce data and complementing the relatively limited empirical work.The experiments, which are conducted using a new online program, are based on the structure of the existing theoretical literature that depicts a situation where an incumbent monopolist, in the face of potential entry by a rival seller, can choose to offer an amount to each buyer willing to sign an exclusive contract. In addition to testing adherence of behavior to theoretical predictions, comparisons across different treatments test the effect of various market conditions such as simultaneous versus sequential buyer decisions, the number of buyers, and buyer communication on the probability of observing deterred entry and decreased efficiency. The results are then applied to determine whether exclusive contracts in real-world industries with specific market characteristics are likely to inefficiently limit competition. In addition, the laboratory allows for replication with both undergraduate students and MBA students with business experience.Broader ImpactsThe benefits of this research to society include a better understanding of the potential harmful effects of exclusive contracts and the determinants of the likelihood of their occurrence. This may influence antitrust policy or more specifically, it may have an effect on how certain antitrust suits are evaluated (i.e., whether or not they are unlawfully harmful to consumers and society). Moreover, the analysis of the experimental results will be disseminated in the form of a doctoral dissertation and both the data and online program will be made publicly available. Not only will this allow others to conduct further experimental research in this area, but the program can also be used as a tool for teaching. Using the experiment for classroom instruction would be an exciting and interactive way for students to learn about exclusive contracts.