Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: An Experimental Study of Exclusive Contracts

经济学博士论文研究：专营契约的实验研究

• 批准号: 0649463
• 负责人: Charles Holt
• 金额: $ 0.84万
• 依托单位: University of Virginia Main Campus
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-03-01 至 2010-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0649463&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Economics; Experimental

A healthy national economy is sustained in part by the ability of competition to induce efficiency among firms. Circumstances in which the welfare of a society is reduced by a lack of competition warrant an explicit and thorough investigation. Exclusive contracts between buyers and sellers are one of these situations that has been theoretically shown to have the potential to hinder competition and decrease efficiency through deterred entry. This project uses experimental methods to examine the efficiency consequences and policy implications surrounding a type of exclusive contract, often referred to as a naked exclusion, which restricts the signed buyer to purchase solely from a specific seller.There has been a scholarly debate as to whether these types of exclusive contracts are ever used in an anticompetitive fashion. Using mathematical models and intuitive observations, some theorists have demonstrated that efficiency-enhancing entry can profitably and successfully be deterred under certain circumstances. This project takes aspects of the theoretical models to a setting where financially motivated individuals make decisions that affect earnings in the same way firm profits are determined. The use of experiments provides a natural way to examine actual behavior under various market conditions while affording advantages in the form of enhanced control and facilitated replication. This project thus provides an ideal way to test the existing theory using the decisions of human subjects while adding to the scarce data and complementing the relatively limited empirical work.The experiments, which are conducted using a new online program, are based on the structure of the existing theoretical literature that depicts a situation where an incumbent monopolist, in the face of potential entry by a rival seller, can choose to offer an amount to each buyer willing to sign an exclusive contract. In addition to testing adherence of behavior to theoretical predictions, comparisons across different treatments test the effect of various market conditions such as simultaneous versus sequential buyer decisions, the number of buyers, and buyer communication on the probability of observing deterred entry and decreased efficiency. The results are then applied to determine whether exclusive contracts in real-world industries with specific market characteristics are likely to inefficiently limit competition. In addition, the laboratory allows for replication with both undergraduate students and MBA students with business experience.Broader ImpactsThe benefits of this research to society include a better understanding of the potential harmful effects of exclusive contracts and the determinants of the likelihood of their occurrence. This may influence antitrust policy or more specifically, it may have an effect on how certain antitrust suits are evaluated (i.e., whether or not they are unlawfully harmful to consumers and society). Moreover, the analysis of the experimental results will be disseminated in the form of a doctoral dissertation and both the data and online program will be made publicly available. Not only will this allow others to conduct further experimental research in this area, but the program can also be used as a tool for teaching. Using the experiment for classroom instruction would be an exciting and interactive way for students to learn about exclusive contracts.

一个健康的国民经济在一定程度上是由企业之间提高效率的竞争能力支撑的。社会福利因缺乏竞争而减少的情况需要进行明确和彻底的调查。买方和卖方之间的排他性合同就是这样一种情况，理论上证明，这种情况有可能阻碍竞争，并通过阻碍进入而降低效率。该项目使用实验方法来研究一种排他性合同的效率后果和政策含义。排他性合同通常被称为裸排除，它限制签署的买方只能从特定的卖方购买。关于这些类型的排他性合同是否曾以反竞争的方式使用，一直存在学术辩论。利用数学模型和直观观察，一些理论家已经证明，在某些情况下，可以有利可图并成功地阻止提高效率的进入。这个项目将理论模型的一些方面带到一个环境中，在这个环境中，出于经济动机的个人做出影响收益的决定，就像决定公司利润的方式一样。使用实验提供了一种自然的方式来检查各种市场条件下的实际行为，同时提供了加强控制和促进复制的形式的优势。因此，该项目提供了一种理想的方式来使用人类主体的决策来测试现有理论，同时增加了稀缺的数据，并补充了相对有限的经验工作。实验使用一个新的在线程序进行，基于现有理论文献的结构，该文献描述了一种情况，即现有垄断者面对竞争对手的潜在进入，可以选择向愿意签署独家合同的每个买家提供一定的金额。除了测试行为对理论预测的一致性，不同处理的比较还测试了各种市场条件的影响，如同时和顺序的买家决策、买家的数量和买家沟通对观察到进入受阻和效率下降的概率的影响。然后将结果应用于确定具有特定市场特征的现实世界行业中的排他性合同是否可能低效地限制竞争。此外，该实验室还允许在本科生和有商业经验的MBA学生之间进行复制。广泛的影响这项研究对社会的好处包括更好地了解排他性合同的潜在有害影响以及发生这些合同的可能性的决定因素。这可能会影响反垄断政策，更具体地说，它可能会对如何评估某些反垄断诉讼产生影响(即，这些诉讼是否对消费者和社会造成非法损害)。此外，实验结果的分析将以博士论文的形式传播，数据和在线程序都将公开。这不仅可以让其他人在这一领域进行进一步的实验研究，而且该程序还可以作为教学工具。将该实验用于课堂教学将是学生学习独家合同的一种令人兴奋和互动的方式。