Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: An Experimental Study of Exclusive Contracts

健康的国民经济在一定程度上是靠企业间竞争提高效率的能力来维持的。 社会福利因缺乏竞争而减少的情况需要进行明确和彻底的调查。 买方和卖方之间的独家合同就是其中一种情况，理论上已证明这种情况有可能通过阻止进入来阻碍竞争并降低效率。 该项目使用实验方法来研究围绕一种排他性合同的效率后果和政策影响，这种合同通常被称为“赤裸裸的排除”，它限制签署的买方只能从特定卖方购买。关于这些类型的排他性合同是否曾经以反竞争的方式使用，学术界一直存在争论。 一些理论家利用数学模型和直观观察证明，在某些情况下，可以有效且成功地阻止提高效率的进入。 该项目将理论模型的各个方面应用到一个环境中，在这个环境中，有经济动机的个人会做出影响收入的决策，就像确定公司利润一样。 实验的使用提供了一种自然的方式来检查各种市场条件下的实际行为，同时以增强控制和促进复制的形式提供优势。 因此，该项目提供了一种理想的方法，利用人类受试者的决策来测试现有理论，同时增加稀缺数据并补充相对有限的实证工作。这些实验是使用新的在线程序进行的，基于现有理论文献的结构，该文献描述了一种情况，即现有垄断者在面对竞争对手卖家的潜在进入时，可以选择向愿意签署独家合同的每个买家提供一定的金额。 除了测试行为与理论预测的一致性之外，不同处理之间的比较还测试了各种市场条件的影响，例如同时与顺序的买家决策、买家数量以及买家沟通对观察阻止进入和效率下降的可能性的影响。 然后将结果用于确定具有特定市场特征的现实行业中的排他性合同是否可能无效地限制竞争。 此外，该实验室还允许对具有商业经验的本科生和 MBA 学生进行复制。 更广泛的影响 这项研究对社会的好处包括更好地了解独家合同的潜在有害影响及其发生可能性的决定因素。 这可能会影响反垄断政策，或更具体地说，可能会影响某些反垄断诉讼的评估方式（即它们是否对消费者和社会非法有害）。 此外，实验结果的分析将以博士论文的形式传播，数据和在线程序都将公开。 这不仅可以让其他人在该领域进行进一步的实验研究，而且该程序还可以用作教学工具。 使用实验进行课堂教学将是学生了解排他性合同的一种令人兴奋的互动方式。

A healthy national economy is sustained in part by the ability of competition to induce efficiency among firms. Circumstances in which the welfare of a society is reduced by a lack of competition warrant an explicit and thorough investigation. Exclusive contracts between buyers and sellers are one of these situations that has been theoretically shown to have the potential to hinder competition and decrease efficiency through deterred entry. This project uses experimental methods to examine the efficiency consequences and policy implications surrounding a type of exclusive contract, often referred to as a naked exclusion, which restricts the signed buyer to purchase solely from a specific seller.There has been a scholarly debate as to whether these types of exclusive contracts are ever used in an anticompetitive fashion. Using mathematical models and intuitive observations, some theorists have demonstrated that efficiency-enhancing entry can profitably and successfully be deterred under certain circumstances. This project takes aspects of the theoretical models to a setting where financially motivated individuals make decisions that affect earnings in the same way firm profits are determined. The use of experiments provides a natural way to examine actual behavior under various market conditions while affording advantages in the form of enhanced control and facilitated replication. This project thus provides an ideal way to test the existing theory using the decisions of human subjects while adding to the scarce data and complementing the relatively limited empirical work.The experiments, which are conducted using a new online program, are based on the structure of the existing theoretical literature that depicts a situation where an incumbent monopolist, in the face of potential entry by a rival seller, can choose to offer an amount to each buyer willing to sign an exclusive contract. In addition to testing adherence of behavior to theoretical predictions, comparisons across different treatments test the effect of various market conditions such as simultaneous versus sequential buyer decisions, the number of buyers, and buyer communication on the probability of observing deterred entry and decreased efficiency. The results are then applied to determine whether exclusive contracts in real-world industries with specific market characteristics are likely to inefficiently limit competition. In addition, the laboratory allows for replication with both undergraduate students and MBA students with business experience.Broader ImpactsThe benefits of this research to society include a better understanding of the potential harmful effects of exclusive contracts and the determinants of the likelihood of their occurrence. This may influence antitrust policy or more specifically, it may have an effect on how certain antitrust suits are evaluated (i.e., whether or not they are unlawfully harmful to consumers and society). Moreover, the analysis of the experimental results will be disseminated in the form of a doctoral dissertation and both the data and online program will be made publicly available. Not only will this allow others to conduct further experimental research in this area, but the program can also be used as a tool for teaching. Using the experiment for classroom instruction would be an exciting and interactive way for students to learn about exclusive contracts.