Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: An Experimental Study of Exclusive Contracts

一个健康的国民经济在一定程度上是靠竞争来提高企业效率的。 一个社会的福利因缺乏竞争而减少的情况需要进行明确和彻底的调查。 买方和卖方之间的独家合同就是其中一种情况，从理论上讲，这种情况被证明有可能通过阻止进入而阻碍竞争和降低效率。 本项目使用实验方法来研究一种排他性合同的效率后果和政策含义，这种合同通常被称为赤裸裸的排除，它限制签署的买方只能从特定的卖方购买。 一些理论家利用数学模型和直观观察证明，在某些情况下，可以有利地成功阻止提高效率的进入。 本项目将理论模型的各个方面应用到一个环境中，在这个环境中，有财务动机的个人做出的决策会影响收入，其方式与确定公司利润的方式相同。 实验的使用提供了一种自然的方式来检查各种市场条件下的实际行为，同时提供了增强控制和促进复制的优势。 因此，该项目提供了一种理想的方式来测试现有的理论，使用人类受试者的决定，同时增加了稀缺的数据，并补充了相对有限的实证工作。实验，这是使用一个新的在线程序进行的，是基于现有的理论文献的结构，描述了一种情况下，现任垄断者，面对潜在的竞争对手卖方进入，可以选择提供一个金额给每个买家愿意签署一份独家合同。 除了测试行为对理论预测的坚持性外，不同处理方法的比较还测试了各种市场条件的影响，例如同时与顺序购买者决策，购买者数量以及购买者沟通对观察到阻止进入和效率下降的概率的影响。 然后，将结果应用于确定是否在现实世界中的行业具有特定的市场特征的排他性合同可能会无效地限制竞争。 此外，该实验室允许复制与本科生和MBA学生的商业经验。更广泛的影响，这项研究对社会的好处包括更好地了解排他性合同的潜在有害影响和发生的可能性的决定因素。 这可能会影响反垄断政策，或者更具体地说，它可能会影响某些反垄断诉讼的评估方式（即，无论是否对消费者和社会造成非法危害）。 此外，实验结果的分析将以博士论文的形式传播，数据和在线程序都将公开。 这不仅可以让其他人在该领域进行进一步的实验研究，而且该程序还可以用作教学工具。 将实验用于课堂教学将是学生学习排他性合同的一种令人兴奋和互动的方式。

A healthy national economy is sustained in part by the ability of competition to induce efficiency among firms. Circumstances in which the welfare of a society is reduced by a lack of competition warrant an explicit and thorough investigation. Exclusive contracts between buyers and sellers are one of these situations that has been theoretically shown to have the potential to hinder competition and decrease efficiency through deterred entry. This project uses experimental methods to examine the efficiency consequences and policy implications surrounding a type of exclusive contract, often referred to as a naked exclusion, which restricts the signed buyer to purchase solely from a specific seller.There has been a scholarly debate as to whether these types of exclusive contracts are ever used in an anticompetitive fashion. Using mathematical models and intuitive observations, some theorists have demonstrated that efficiency-enhancing entry can profitably and successfully be deterred under certain circumstances. This project takes aspects of the theoretical models to a setting where financially motivated individuals make decisions that affect earnings in the same way firm profits are determined. The use of experiments provides a natural way to examine actual behavior under various market conditions while affording advantages in the form of enhanced control and facilitated replication. This project thus provides an ideal way to test the existing theory using the decisions of human subjects while adding to the scarce data and complementing the relatively limited empirical work.The experiments, which are conducted using a new online program, are based on the structure of the existing theoretical literature that depicts a situation where an incumbent monopolist, in the face of potential entry by a rival seller, can choose to offer an amount to each buyer willing to sign an exclusive contract. In addition to testing adherence of behavior to theoretical predictions, comparisons across different treatments test the effect of various market conditions such as simultaneous versus sequential buyer decisions, the number of buyers, and buyer communication on the probability of observing deterred entry and decreased efficiency. The results are then applied to determine whether exclusive contracts in real-world industries with specific market characteristics are likely to inefficiently limit competition. In addition, the laboratory allows for replication with both undergraduate students and MBA students with business experience.Broader ImpactsThe benefits of this research to society include a better understanding of the potential harmful effects of exclusive contracts and the determinants of the likelihood of their occurrence. This may influence antitrust policy or more specifically, it may have an effect on how certain antitrust suits are evaluated (i.e., whether or not they are unlawfully harmful to consumers and society). Moreover, the analysis of the experimental results will be disseminated in the form of a doctoral dissertation and both the data and online program will be made publicly available. Not only will this allow others to conduct further experimental research in this area, but the program can also be used as a tool for teaching. Using the experiment for classroom instruction would be an exciting and interactive way for students to learn about exclusive contracts.