Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: An Experimental Analysis of Settlement Delay in Tort Litigation

该奖项资助了关于侵权诉讼中延迟和解决定因素的实验室实验。在美国，侵权案件往往表现出损害时间和纠纷解决之间的长期延迟。争端各方往往只有在经过漫长的法律程序后才会就解决条件达成一致。花费在和解谈判上的资源很大，而且在经济上效率低下。该研究验证了一个流行的假设，即争论者可获得的信息种类的差异导致了拖延。这些实验检验了两个问题。首先，信息不对称是否会导致长时间的结算延迟？第二，哪些政策有助于缓解结算延迟？这些实验包括参与者在一系列模拟诉讼中进行实时谈判。实验设计允许在控制个体差异和学习行为的同时估计重要的治疗效果。美国侵权制度的社会成本估计为每年2500亿美元，更好地理解为什么侵权案件达成延迟和解可能具有重大的社会效益。这个项目的结果将有助于我们评估侵权制度改革的效果。

This award funds laboratory experiments on the determinants of delayed settlements in tort ligation.In the United States, tort cases often exhibit protracted delay between the time of injury and settlement of a dispute. Parties to a dispute tend to agree on settlement conditions only after engaging in lengthy legal procedures. Resources spent on settlement negotiation are large and econonomically inefficient. The research tests the popular hypothesis that differences in the kinds of information available to the disputants results in delay. The experiments examine two questions. First, does asymmetric information lead to lengthy settlement delays? Second, what policies help mitigate settlement delay? The experiments involve real-time negotiation between participants in a series of mock lawsuits. The experimental design allows for estimation of important treatment effects while controlling for individual differences and for learning behavior.With the social cost of the U.S. tort system estimated at $250 billion per year, better understanding of why tort cases reach delayed settlements may have substantial societal benefts. The results of this project will help us to evaluate the effects of proposed reforms of the tort system.