Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: An Experimental Analysis of Settlement Delay in Tort Litigation

该奖项资助了关于侵权诉讼延迟解决决定因素的实验室实验。在美国，侵权案件通常表现出从损害时间到争端解决的长期延迟。争端各方往往只有在经过冗长的法律程序后才会就解决条件达成一致。花在和解谈判上的资源很多，而且经济上效率低下。这项研究验证了一个流行的假设，即争议者可获得的信息种类的不同会导致延迟。这些实验考察了两个问题。首先，信息不对称是否会导致漫长的和解拖延？第二，哪些政策有助于缓解结算延误？这些实验涉及一系列模拟诉讼参与者之间的实时谈判。实验设计允许在控制个体差异和学习行为的同时估计重要的治疗效果。由于美国侵权制度的社会成本估计为每年2500亿美元，更好地理解侵权案件为什么会延迟解决可能会产生巨大的社会效益。该项目的结果将有助于我们评估拟议的侵权制度改革的效果。

This award funds laboratory experiments on the determinants of delayed settlements in tort ligation.In the United States, tort cases often exhibit protracted delay between the time of injury and settlement of a dispute. Parties to a dispute tend to agree on settlement conditions only after engaging in lengthy legal procedures. Resources spent on settlement negotiation are large and econonomically inefficient. The research tests the popular hypothesis that differences in the kinds of information available to the disputants results in delay. The experiments examine two questions. First, does asymmetric information lead to lengthy settlement delays? Second, what policies help mitigate settlement delay? The experiments involve real-time negotiation between participants in a series of mock lawsuits. The experimental design allows for estimation of important treatment effects while controlling for individual differences and for learning behavior.With the social cost of the U.S. tort system estimated at $250 billion per year, better understanding of why tort cases reach delayed settlements may have substantial societal benefts. The results of this project will help us to evaluate the effects of proposed reforms of the tort system.