Institutions and Economic Growth-The Case of Professional Bureaucracy

制度与​​经济增长——以专业官僚机构为例

• 批准号: 9415480
• 负责人: James Rauch
• 金额: $ 15.89万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1994
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1994-09-01 至 1998-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9415480&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Institutions; Economic; Growth; Case; Professional

9415480 Rauch This research will develop a theoretical model of bureaucratic institutions. The project is based on the idea that the creation of salaried professional bureaucrats changes the way government functions, because it changes the incentive mechanisms facing bureaucrats. Governments which have this kind of bureauractic structure tend to take a longer view of the benefits from public expenditures decisions. This means that they will tend at the margin to allocate a greater proportion of government resources to infrastructure projects that have a more distant payoff. The theoretical model is developed in which city government is modelled in a principal-agent framework. The principal is the elected official and the agents are the civil servants. Then the model is extended to bureaucratic institutions in less developed countries, in which it can be shown that merit-based promotion policies tend to reduce corruption and enhance the efficiency of government. The models are tested using data for U.S. cities in the early part of this century that experienced a wave of muinicipal reform. Next the theory is put to a more direct test to ascertain whether less-developed countries with merit-based promotion systems will exhibit higher growth rates, all else equal, than those that do not. Data on growth rates of the less-developed countries are used. This project is of significant interest because it attempts to link bureauratic structure with efficiency in the provision of governmental goods and services. The results from the study promise to give us an understanding of the relationship between bureaucratic performance and economic growth.

小行星9415480 本研究将建立一个官僚制度的理论模型。该项目基于这样一种想法，即创造受薪的职业官僚改变了政府的运作方式，因为它改变了官僚面临的激励机制。具有这种行政结构的政府往往从更长远的角度来看待公共支出决策的好处。这意味着它们将倾向于将更大比例的政府资源分配给回报较远的基础设施项目。在委托代理框架下，建立了城市政府的理论模型。委托人是民选官员，代理人是公务员。 然后将该模型推广到欠发达国家的官僚机构，结果表明，基于绩效的晋升政策有助于减少腐败，提高政府效率。这些模型是使用本世纪早期经历了一波又一波改革的美国城市的数据进行测试的。接下来，我们将对这一理论进行更直接的检验，以确定在其他条件相同的情况下，实行绩效晋升制度的欠发达国家是否会比不实行这种制度的国家表现出更高的增长率。使用了较不发达国家的增长率数据。 这一项目具有重大意义，因为它试图将行政结构与提供政府货物和服务的效率联系起来。研究结果有望让我们了解官僚绩效与经济增长之间的关系。