Competitive and Strategic Equilibrium in Auction Environments

该提案涉及不可分割商品的市场，由两个项目组成。第一个项目研究完全信息经济中瓦尔拉斯均衡的存在性和有效性。他们证明了偏好的两个性质，即可替代性和单调性足以保证瓦尔拉斯均衡的存在。我们建议找出这些平衡的附加性质。第二个项目涉及具有相同偏好集的私人价值不完全信息经济的临时有效的、激励相容的贝叶斯机制的特征。P.I.表明，有效的机制本质上是维克里-格罗夫斯-克拉克（第二价格）拍卖机制。建议将结果扩展到具有共同价值观的个人偏好的情况。

Faruk Gul and Ennio Stacchetti Northwestern University SBR-9510942 The proposal concerns markets with indivisible goods and consists of two projects. The first project concerns the existence and efficiency of Walrasian equilibrium in an economy with complete information. The P.I. shows that two properties of preferences, which they call substitutability and monotonicity are sufficient to ensure the existence o a Walrasian equilibrium. The propose to find additional properties of the these equilibria. The second project concerns the characterization of the interim efficient, incentive-compatible Bayesian mechanisms for the private-values incomplete information economy with the same set of preferences. The P.I. shows that the efficient mechanisms are essentially Vickery-Groves-Clarke (2nd price) auction mechanisms. The proposal is to extend the results to the case of private preferences with common values..