Competitive and Strategic Equilibrium in Auction Environments

拍卖环境中的竞争和战略均衡

• 批准号: 9510942
• 负责人: Faruk Gul
• 金额: $ 17.28万
• 依托单位: Princeton University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1995
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1995-11-01 至 1998-10-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9510942&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Competitive; Strategic; Equilibrium; Auction; Environments

Faruk Gul and Ennio Stacchetti Northwestern University SBR-9510942 The proposal concerns markets with indivisible goods and consists of two projects. The first project concerns the existence and efficiency of Walrasian equilibrium in an economy with complete information. The P.I. shows that two properties of preferences, which they call substitutability and monotonicity are sufficient to ensure the existence o a Walrasian equilibrium. The propose to find additional properties of the these equilibria. The second project concerns the characterization of the interim efficient, incentive-compatible Bayesian mechanisms for the private-values incomplete information economy with the same set of preferences. The P.I. shows that the efficient mechanisms are essentially Vickery-Groves-Clarke (2nd price) auction mechanisms. The proposal is to extend the results to the case of private preferences with common values..

Faruk Gul和Ennio Stacchetti西北大学SBR-9510942 该提案涉及具有不可分割商品的市场，包括两个项目。第一个项目是关于完全信息经济中瓦尔拉斯均衡的存在性和有效性。 私家侦探表明偏好的两个性质，他们称之为可替代性和单调性，足以确保存在瓦尔拉斯均衡。 他们的建议是寻找这些均衡的其他性质。第二个项目涉及的临时有效的，激励相容的贝叶斯机制的私人价值不完全信息经济的特性与相同的偏好。 私家侦探结果表明，有效的机制本质上是Vickery-Groves-Clarke（第二价格）拍卖机制。该建议是将结果扩展到具有共同价值观的私人偏好的情况。