Random and Dynamic Choice

本提案包含两个相关的动态选择研究项目。这两个项目都将与普林斯顿大学的Wolfgang Pesendorfer共同进行。通常，观察到的选择行为将不符合单一的，确定性的选择标准（即，效用函数）。也就是说，决策者会在几乎完全相同的情况下做出不同的选择。这种行为最好用随机选择来建模。第一个项目名为“随机效用，不确定情绪和有限理性”，解决了以下问题：何时可以将随机选择解释为最大化随机选择标准的结果，以对备选方案进行排序。因此，我们研究从选择效用函数的固定概率规则派生的行为的后果。选择效用函数后，代理在可用选项中选择使其最大化的选项。这种解释行为的方法对于分析聚合数据、有限理性行为和信息不对称情况具有重要意义。在我们的工作中，我们研究了对风险前景和随机选择的期望效用函数的选择。第二个项目名为“变化口味的揭示偏好理论”，研究动态不一致性。动态不一致指的是代理根据被要求做出选择的时间，从同一组备选方案中做出不同选择的倾向。例如，如果一个人喜欢较晚的较大奖励而不是较早的较小奖励，那么随着较早的较小奖励日期的临近，他可能会改变自己的偏好。许多决策问题要求agent在不同的时刻做出选择。在这类问题中，关键在于决策者如何形成对自己未来行为的预期。本研究的立场是，行为人对其未来行为的信念可以通过其当前行为进行最好的分析，并试图通过选择实验来识别这些信念。也就是说，我们希望找到一种方法来确定agent从当前阶段的实际选择中对其未来行为的期望。揭示偏好方法的优势在于，对选择问题的偏好——至少在原则上——是可以观察到的。

This proposal contains two related research projects on dynamic choice. Both of these projects will be undertaken jointly with Wolfgang Pesendorfer of Princeton University.Often, observed choice behavior will not be consistent with a single, deterministic choice criterion (i.e., utility function). That is, the decision-maker will make different choices in virtually identical situations. Such behavior is best modeled as random choice. The first project entitled "Random Utility, Uncertain Moods and Bounded Rationality," addresses the following question: when can a random choice be interpreted as the consequence of maximizing a randomly chosen criterion for ranking the alternatives. Hence, we investigate the consequences of behavior that is derived from a fixed, probabilistic rule for selecting a utility function. After the utility function is selected, the agent chooses the alternative that maximizes it among the available options. This way of interpreting behavior is important for the analysis of aggregate data, boundedly rational behavior and situations with asymmetric information. In our work, we study choice over risk prospects and randomly selected expected utility functions.The second project entitled "The Revealed Preference Theory of Changing Tastes" studies dynamic inconsistency. Dynamic inconsistency refers to the tendency of agents to make different choices from the same set of alternatives depending on when they are asked to choose. For example, an individual who prefers a larger later reward to a smaller earlier reward may reverse his preference as the date of the smaller earlier reward gets closer. Many decision problems require the agent to make choices at various moments in time. In such problems, the key is how the decision-maker forms expectations about his own future behavior. This research takes the position that the agent's beliefs regarding his future behavior can best be analyzed through his current behavior and seeks to identify these beliefs through choice experiments. That is, we wish to identify methods for determining the agent's expectations about his future behavior from actual choices made in the current period. The advantage of the revealed preference approach is that preferences over choice problems are - at least in principal - observable.