Durable Goods Monopoly Experiments

耐用品垄断理论为产业组织经济学家提供了一个常用的分析框架。在这一理论的大多数表述中，耐用性是一种产品特征，用于限制卖家的垄断力量。尽管这一理论得到了广泛应用，但很少受到实证检验。该项目利用实验室实验来评估耐用品垄断理论的预测。实验室方法允许研究人员控制环境的特征(如关于其他代理人的收益、时间折扣、时间范围的长度的信息)，这些信息被理论模型确定为市场结果的关键决定因素。实验的设计基于不对称信息模型，在该模型中，一个或多个买家被私下告知他们对商品的估值。通过多周期交易结构和外生诱导的时间折现，将耐久性引入实验。考虑信息不对称的均衡预测价格低于静态垄断价格，需求抑制(即买家拒绝有利可图的报价)的发生率很高。实验结果被用来评估关于定价和需求抑制的定量均衡预测，以及关于耐用和非耐用产品类型的影响、买家价值分布的变化、短期和长期交易范围以及为买家提供最佳价格保证的合同条款的定性、比较静态预测。这项研究的一个重要部分是考察公平感和学习在解释观察到的行为中的作用。长交易期限的实验可以评估一个引人注目的理论预测；即所谓的科斯猜想，即垄断者的初始报价将接近边际成本。

Durable goods monopoly theory provides a commonly-used framework of analysis for Industrial Organization economists. In most formulations of this theory, durability is a product characteristic that serves to restrict a seller's monopoly power. In spite of its widespread use, this theory has been subject to little empirical scrutiny. This project utilizes laboratory experiments to evaluate predictions from durable goods monopoly theory. Laboratory methods permit the researcher to control features of the environment (such as information about other agents' payoffs, time discounting, length of time horizon) that theoretical models identify as key determinants of market outcomes. The design of experiments is based on an asymmetric information model in which one or more buyers are privately informed about their valuation for the good. Durability is introduced into the experiments through a multi period trading structure and exogenously-induced time discounting. The equilibrium that takes the information asymmetries into account predicts prices below the static monopoly price and a high incidence of demand withholding (i.e., a buyer's rejection of a profitable offer). Results from experiments are used to assess quantitative equilibrium predictions on pricing and demand withholding and qualitative, comparative-static predictions concerning the effects of durable vs. non durable product type, changes in the distribution of buyers' values, short vs. long trading horizons, and contractual provisions that provide buyers with best price guarantees. An important part of the research is an examination of the roles of fairness perceptions and of learning in explaining observed behavior. The long trading horizon experiments permit evaluation of a striking theoretical prediction; the so called Coase conjecture, that the initial price offer of the monopolist will be close to marginal cost.