Durable Goods Monopoly Experiments

耐用品垄断实验

• 批准号: 9809110
• 负责人: Stanley Reynolds
• 金额: $ 8.01万
• 依托单位: University of Arizona
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1998
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1998-09-01 至 2001-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9809110&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Durable; Goods; Monopoly; Experiments

Durable goods monopoly theory provides a commonly-used framework of analysis for Industrial Organization economists. In most formulations of this theory, durability is a product characteristic that serves to restrict a seller's monopoly power. In spite of its widespread use, this theory has been subject to little empirical scrutiny. This project utilizes laboratory experiments to evaluate predictions from durable goods monopoly theory. Laboratory methods permit the researcher to control features of the environment (such as information about other agents' payoffs, time discounting, length of time horizon) that theoretical models identify as key determinants of market outcomes. The design of experiments is based on an asymmetric information model in which one or more buyers are privately informed about their valuation for the good. Durability is introduced into the experiments through a multi period trading structure and exogenously-induced time discounting. The equilibrium that takes the information asymmetries into account predicts prices below the static monopoly price and a high incidence of demand withholding (i.e., a buyer's rejection of a profitable offer). Results from experiments are used to assess quantitative equilibrium predictions on pricing and demand withholding and qualitative, comparative-static predictions concerning the effects of durable vs. non durable product type, changes in the distribution of buyers' values, short vs. long trading horizons, and contractual provisions that provide buyers with best price guarantees. An important part of the research is an examination of the roles of fairness perceptions and of learning in explaining observed behavior. The long trading horizon experiments permit evaluation of a striking theoretical prediction; the so called Coase conjecture, that the initial price offer of the monopolist will be close to marginal cost.

耐用品垄断理论为产业组织经济学家提供了一个常用的分析框架。在这一理论的大多数表述中，耐用性是一种产品特性，用于限制卖方的垄断权力。尽管这一理论被广泛使用，但很少受到实证检验。 本研究利用实验室实验来评估耐用品垄断理论的预测。 实验室方法允许研究人员控制环境的特征（如其他代理人的回报，时间折扣，时间范围的长度），理论模型确定为市场结果的关键决定因素。 实验的设计是基于一个不对称的信息模型，其中一个或多个买家私下了解他们的估价为好。 通过多期交易结构和外生时间折扣引入耐久性。考虑到信息不对称的均衡预测价格低于静态垄断价格和需求抑制的高发生率（即，买方拒绝有利可图的报价）。 实验结果用于评估对定价和需求抑制的定量均衡预测，以及对耐用品与非耐用品类型的影响、买家价值分布的变化、短期与长期的定性、比较静态预测。交易期限，以及为买家提供最佳价格保证的合同条款。这项研究的一个重要部分是检查公平的看法和学习的作用，解释观察到的行为。长期交易期实验允许评估一个惊人的理论预测，即所谓的科斯猜想，即垄断者的初始价格将接近边际成本。