The Interaction Between Electoral Preferences and Party Leaders in Britain

英国选举偏好与政党领导人之间的互动

• 批准号: 9818582
• 负责人: Norman Schofield
• 金额: $ 7.5万
• 依托单位: Washington University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1999
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1999-04-01 至 2000-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9818582&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Interaction; Between; Electoral; Preferences; Party

Theoretical spatial voting models typically assume that parties are unitary actors and adopt pre-election policy positions so as to maximize electoral vote (or seat strengths). Recent work by the principal investigator and his colleagues has constructed multi-nomial probit (MNP) models of electoral response in a number of European countries, and Israel. While the models accurately capture electoral behavior, it is also quite obvious that parties are generally not vote maximizers. Formal analysis has proposed that parties in polities based on proportional representation (PR) adopt pre-election policies with a view to pros-election coalition bargaining. However, such models do not explain pre-election party choices in Britain, where explicit government coalitions are rare.This research builds an integrated model of electoral and party behavior in the "majoritarian" British polity, focussing on the 1992 and 1997 elections. To construct the MNP model of British elections, data on both voter preferred positions and party declarations are required. Survey data, available from the Essex Archive are used to generate sample distributions of voter preferences. Computer coding of party manifestos are used to estimate party positions. Voter intentions are used to estimate the MNP model. Additional monthly Gallup "popularity" data, together with economic variables and retrospective/prospective aggregate data are used to refine the MNP model of electoral vote. The electoral model so constructed will provide insight into the degree of "strategic" electoral behavior.Simulation of the operation of the pattern of districting (into constituencies) permits an estimation of the operator relating party positions to seat strengths. The policy preferences of British Legislators are obtained through questionnaires. These, together with survey data on attitudes of party activists, are used to analyze the internal decision problem within each party over the choice of party leader and construction of election manifestos.Related theoretical work focuses on the nature of strategic maneuvering by the three major parties prior to elections.The integration of the theoretical and empirical models on Britain, together with parallel work on European "multiparty" policies improves understand of the nature of the "structural" differences between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. The combination of macro-political models and micro-electoral analysis has the potential to contribute substantially to the understanding of democratic decision-making under different institutional arrangements.

理论空间投票模型通常假设政党是单一的行为者，并采取选举前的政策立场，以最大限度地提高选举人票（或席位优势）。 最近的工作由首席研究员和他的同事们构建了多名概率（MNP）模型的选举反应在一些欧洲国家，以色列。 虽然这些模型准确地捕捉了选举行为，但很明显，政党通常不是选票最大化者。 正式的分析表明，在基于比例代表制（PR）的政治中，政党采取选举前的政策，以期有利于选举的联盟谈判。 然而，这样的模型并不能解释在英国，明确的政府联盟是rared.This研究建立了一个综合模型的选举和政党的行为在“多数主义”的英国政体，集中在1992年和1997年的选举前的政党选择。 要构建英国选举的MNP模型，需要选民偏好立场和政党声明的数据。 调查数据，可从埃塞克斯档案被用来生成样本分布的选民的喜好。 政党宣言的计算机编码被用来估计政党的立场。 选民意向被用来估计MNP模型。 额外的每月盖洛普"受欢迎程度"数据，以及经济变量和回顾/前瞻性的汇总数据，用于完善MNP模型的选举人票。 这样构建的选举模型将提供对"战略性"选举行为程度的洞察。对选区划分模式的模拟允许对将政党立场与席位优势相关联的操作者进行估计。 英国立法者的政策偏好是通过问卷调查获得的。 本文结合政党活动家态度的调查数据，分析了各政党在党魁选择和竞选宣言构建等问题上的内部决策问题。相关的理论工作主要集中在三大政党在选举前的战略操纵的本质上。与欧洲"多党"政策的平行工作一起，提高了对多数主义和比例选举制度之间"结构性"差异性质的理解。 宏观政治模型和微观选举分析相结合，有可能大大有助于理解不同体制安排下的民主决策。