The Strategy of Party Competition

在先前对政党竞争影响政策制定的模型的研究中，研究人员假设政党要么寻求尽可能接近其首选立场的政策实施，要么采取政策立场以试图最大化其选举支持。首席研究员先前的理论工作表明，这两个考虑因素都与多党制民主国家的政党竞争有关。在这项调查中，研究人员将利用最近的理论分析，利用博弈论和社会选择，以及对政党政策的实证研究，构建一个多党制民主国家（主要是欧洲国家）政治竞争的一般模型。事实证明，从一般理论的角度分析这些国家的联合政治是非常困难的。然而，仔细研究其中一些国家(包括德国、荷兰、比利时、意大利、瑞典、丹麦)对这些国家的党派间谈判和讨价还价进程以及因此而形成的联合政府提供了更清晰的图景。这项研究应提供对政策执行过程和政治进程稳定性具有普遍有效性的见解。

In prior research on models of political party competition as it affects policy formulation, researchers have assumed either that parties seek to implement policy as close to a preferred position as possible, or that they adopt policy positions in an attempt to maximize their electoral support. Prior theoretical work by the Principal Investigator suggests that both considerations are relevant for party competition in multiparty democracies. In this investigation the researchers will draw on recent theoretical analyses using game theory and social choice as well as empirical work on party policies to construct a general model of political competition in multiparty democracies, principally in European countries. Coalition politics in such countries has proved very difficult to analyze from a general theoretical perspective. However, careful study of the declared policy positions of parties in a number of these countries (including Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Sweden, Denmark) has provided a clearer picture of the process of inter-party negotiation and bargaining and hence of government coalition formation in these countries. This research should provide insights that are of general validity on the process of policy implementation and on the stability of the political process.