SGER: Forces of Political Change in Pre-election Russia: Institutions, Elites, and Party System Formation

俄罗斯联邦雄心勃勃的领导人在选举前讨价还价，既影响选民在投票箱面前选择的性质，也影响全国选举的结果。由于这些获胜者塑造了随后的制度变革，选举前的精英争斗的影响可能会比他们的实际任期长得多。同样，政党制度结构内的精英讨价还价也影响选民与其代表之间联系的性质和持久性。在资金支持下，该项目于1999年11月调查了俄罗斯各地的政党工作人员，以评估在俄罗斯新生民主的关键时刻，选举前谈判过程对政党凝聚力和政党制度形成的影响。这些精英水平的数据为同时进行的大众水平的研究提供了重要的补充。精英数据提供了一种方法来检验有关党组织在纲领基础上竞争能力的主张。最后，额外的数据允许测试关于制度结构（如混合选举法和总理总统制）对政党制度形成的影响的命题。

Pre-election bargaining among ambitious leaders in the Russian Federation influences both the nature of choice presented to voters at the ballot box and the outcome of national elections. As these winners shape subsequent institutional changes, the effects of elite wrangling prior to elections are likely to be felt far longer than their actual terms in office. Similarly, elite bargaining within the structure of the party system also influences the nature and durability of linkages between voters and their representatives. With funding, this project surveys party functionaries across Russia in November 1999 to assess the effects of the pre-election bargaining process on party cohesion and party system formation at this critical juncture in Russia's nascent democracy. These elite-level data provide an important complement to the mass-level studies conducted at the same time. Elite data provide a means to test propositions regarding the capacity of party organizations to compete on a programmatic basis. Finally, the additional data allow the testing of propositions about the effects of institutional structures (such as mixed electoral laws and premier-presidential systems) on party system formation.