Social Norms, Institutions and Growth
Social Norms, Institutions and Growth
批准号:
9986170
负责人:
David Levine
金额:
$19.95万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2000
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2000-07-01 至 2003-06-30
中文摘要
9986170莱文该项目的目标是提供一个连贯的框架,了解经济制度的出现和后果及其对增长的影响。纵观历史,很明显,有些机构比其他机构相对更成功。哪些机构会出现,哪些机构会成功?需要什么样的社会规范来支持特定的机构?生产技术如何影响制度?该项目从理论上和实验室中解决了这些问题,并将研究结果与历史和当前的机构联系起来。 短期目标是开发简单的模型,使我们能够理解哪些社会规范和制度将在特定环境中出现,并将其与在现场和实验室观察到的社会规范和制度联系起来。 长期目标是提供一个综合的理论。不同的制度在促进增长、提高效率和抑制冲突的程度上是不同的。我们对竞争环境比较了解。对非竞争性环境的了解较少。从实验室的实验,以及休闲主义,对他人的态度发挥了重要的作用,他们没有在竞争环境中发挥作用。对于小麦市场来说,消费者个人对某个小麦种植户的看法并不重要。然而,高层雇员对雇主的态度直接关系到公司的成功。 这个项目的观点是,对他人的态度是作为一种平衡现象出现的社会规范。动态平衡决定了某个时刻的偏好,可能是利他的,也可能是恶意的,尽管潜在的自私。 第一个项目是从理论上研究这种社会规范如何发挥作用,以支持一个简单和原始的社会。 这个简单的平等主义均衡是如何随着人口规模和信息技术参数的变化而打破的?这为理解更复杂的机构必须处理的问题奠定了坚实的基础。作为补充,第二个项目旨在研究实验室中现有的社会规范。关键问题之一是社会规范的一致性。是特定的球员心怀恶意,还是他们的恶意是由对方球员的比赛引发的?社会规范在不同规模的人群中有何不同?社会规范是否会在实验室中适应均衡,如果是,需要多长时间?信息如何在玩家判断对手意图的过程中发挥作用,这对他们的游戏有影响吗?这些是我们计划在实验室里研究的一些问题。当我们超越简单的相对平等的制度时。专业化变得很重要。专业化对发展和技术进步也至关重要。 第三个分项目继续以前关于规模收益递减的爆炸性增长的工作。 我们的目标是更仔细地研究专业化的作用,并与那些因创意或设计而产生固定成本的经济体进行明确的比较,我们在该领域观察到的制度的关键要素之一是强调避免代价高昂的冲突。 最后一个项目的重点是冲突及其产生的原因。它扩展了现有的静态文献的冲突,检查在何种程度上可能会出现冲突,由于时间一致性问题,并通过一系列的小让步来避免。
英文摘要
9986170LevineThe goal of the project is to provide a coherent framework for understanding the emergence and consequences of economic institutions and their impact on growth. Examining wide spans of history, it is apparent that some institutions are relatively more successful than others. Which institutions will emerge, and which will be successful? What social norms are needed to support particular institutions? How does production technology impact on institutions? This project addresses these issues theoretically and in the laboratory and relates the findings to historical and current institutions. The short-term goal is to develop simple models that enable us to understand which social norms and institutions will emerge in particular environments, and to relate this to social norms and institutions observed in the field and laboratory. The long-term goal is to provide an integrated theory.Institutions differ in the extent to which they promote growth, efficiency and inhibit conflict. Competitive environments we understand relatively well. Non-competitive environments are less well understood. From laboratory experiments, as well as casual empiricism, attitudes towards others play an important role that they do not play in competitive environments. It matters little to the wheat market how a consumer personally feels about a particular wheat farmer. However, the attitude of a top-level employee toward an employer has a direct bearing on how successful the firm will be. The perspective taken in this project is that attitudes towards others are social norms that arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. The dynamic equilibrium determines preferences at a moment of time that may be altruistic or spiteful, despite underlying selfishness. The first project is a theoretical study of how such social norms function to support a simple and primitive society. How does this simple egalitarian equilibrium breaks down as the population size and parameters of information and technology vary. This gives a solid foundation for understanding what problems more complex institutions must deal with.Complementary to this, the second project is designed to examine existing social norms in the laboratory. One of the key questions is the consistency of social norms. Are particular players spiteful, or is their spite triggered by the play of opposing players? How do social norms differ in populations of different sizes? Will social norms adapt to equilibrium in the laboratory, and if so, over what time horizon? How does information play a role in enabling players to determine the intentions of their opponents, and does this make a difference to their play? These are some of the issues we plan to study in the laboratory.As we move beyond simple relatively egalitarian institutions. specialization becomes important. Specialization is also crucial in development and technological progress. The third sub-project continues previous work on explosive growth with diminishing returns to scale. The goal is to examine more closely the role of specialization, and make an explicit comparison to economies in which there are fixed costs due to ideas or designs.One of the key elements of institutions we observe in the field is the emphasis on avoiding costly conflict. The final project focuses on conflict and why it arises. It extend an existing static literature on conflict to examine the extent to which conflict may arise due to time consistency problems, and be avoided through a series of small concessions.
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会议论文
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批准号:0851315
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依托单位:
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依托单位:
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依托单位:
Markov Equilibria of Stationary Rational Expectations Models
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依托单位:
海外基金