Collaborative Research: Anonymous Protocols

这项工作的目的是支持协议的理解和发展，这些协议可以在互联网上提供个人隐私。虽然已经提出并实现了一些协议来隐藏网络通信器的IP地址，但对这些协议还没有系统的研究，也没有分析这些协议的匿名性和安全性的方法。对匿名的透彻理解不仅对个人隐私匿名协议的开发、分析和使用很重要，而且对理解网络攻击者如何隐藏他们的位置以及开发跟踪这些攻击者的方法也很重要。我们的最终目标是为匿名开发新的技术和协议，包括类似于为身份验证协议开发的“匿名逻辑”，可用于描述和分析匿名协议。本提案考虑了这一研究领域的一些贡献。我们的第一个贡献将是对匿名通信采取比以前的工作更普遍的看法，通过考虑对所有其他方隐藏响应者身份的协议和技术，并提供完全匿名的通信，其中发起者和响应者对彼此和所有其他方都是匿名的。前一种技术对匿名网站很有用（而不仅仅是匿名网页浏览）；后一种技术对于互联网上真正的双方隐私很有用。我们的第二类贡献将是考虑广义协议构造。这扩展了我们过去的工作，该工作解除了匿名通信的正向和反向路径的耦合，从而产生了大量的匿名协议。我们将继续调查这些协议，并检查哪些网络支持可用于匿名通信，以及未来可能提供的最佳支持。我们的第三个贡献将是为匿名协议提供一种形式，这样就可以通过陈述假设和从定义协议的以下步骤推导出逻辑结论来推断关于实体身份的信念。第四，我们将以深入的方式考虑匿名路由协议的网络性能，不仅包括延迟和流量，还包括流媒体应用程序和传统的基于tcp的大数据传输应用程序的要求。最后，我们将考虑到目前为止被忽视的现有协议的安全问题，首先考虑路径分析攻击和导致一些参与者被第三方不公平指控的攻击。我们提出的匿名逻辑所提供的形式主义将是我们安全分析工作的基础组成部分。这两个机构之间的合作将使我们能够利用马萨诸塞大学现有的网络优势和普渡大学现有的安全优势

The purpose of this work is to support the understanding and development of protocolsthat can provide personal privacy over the Internet. While there have been some protocolsproposed and implemented that hide the IP address of network communicators, there has beenno systematic study of such protocols, nor have methods of analyzing the anonymity and securityof those protocols been developed. A thorough understanding of anonymity is important not onlyfor the development, analysis, and use of anonymous protocols for personal privacy, but also forunderstanding how network attackers can hide their location and for developing methods to trackthose attackers. Our eventual goal is to develop new techniques and protocols for anonymity,including a \logic of anonymity" similar to those developed for authentication protocols thatcan be used to describe and analyze anonymous protocols.This proposal considers a number of contributions on this research area. Our first contri-bution will be to take a more general view of anonymous communication than previous workby considering protocols and techniques for hiding the identity of a responder from all otherparties, and for providing completely anonymous communication in which both the initiator andresponder are anonymous to each other and all other parties. The former technique is usefulfor anonymous web sites (rather than just anonymous web browsing); the later technique isuseful for true two-party privacy over the Internet. Our second class of contributions will be toconsider generalized protocol construction. This extends our past work, which de-coupled theforward and reverse paths of anonymous communication, giving rise to a large family of anony-mous protocols. We will continue investigation of those protocols, and examine what networksupport is available for anonymous communication and what support might best be provided inthe future. Our third contribution will be to provide a formalism for anonymous protocols suchthat beliefs regarding entity identities can be reasoned by stating assumptions and deriving log-ical conclusions from following steps of defined protocols. Fourth, we will consider the networkperformance of anonymous routing protocols in an in-depth fashion, including not only latencyand traffic, but also requirements of streaming media applications and traditional TCP-basedbulk-data transfer applications. Finally, we will consider heretofore ignored security concernsof existing protocols, initially considering path analysis attacks and attacks that cause someparticipants to be unfairly accused by third parties. The formalism provided by our proposedlogic of anonymity will be a foundational component of our security analysis work.Collaboration between these our two institutions will allow us to leverage the existingstrength in networking at the University of Massachusetts and the existing strength in secu-rity at Purdue.1