Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

最优借贷合同和企业动态

• 批准号: 0110946
• 负责人: Hugo Hopenhayn
• 金额: $ 6.38万
• 依托单位: University of Rochester
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2001
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2001-08-01 至 2003-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0110946&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Optimal; Lending; Contracts; Firm; Dynamics

This project studies borrowing constraints and their implications for firmgrowth and survival. Recent empirical work suggests that financialconstraints are an important determinant of the evolution of small and youngfirms. As repayment of loans cannot be always guaranteed, long-termcontracts can often provide better incentives to borrowers. Applying recentadvances in contract theory, this project considers the optimal design ofsuch long-term lending contracts. Implications for firm dynamics --growth andsurvival-- of small and young firms are considered.

本项目研究借贷限制及其对企业成长和生存的影响。最近的实证研究表明，金融约束是一个重要的决定因素的演变，小型和中小型企业。 由于贷款的偿还不能总是得到保证，长期合同往往可以为借款人提供更好的激励。应用契约理论的最新进展，这个项目考虑了这种长期借贷契约的最优设计。公司动态的影响-增长和生存-的小型和年轻的公司被认为是。