Social Insurance, Economic Policy and the Labor Market

社会保险、经济政策和劳动力市场

• 批准号: 9514717
• 负责人: Hugo Hopenhayn
• 金额: $ 17.57万
• 依托单位: University of Rochester
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1996
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1996-04-15 至 2000-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9514717&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Social; Insurance; Economic; Policy; Labor

Hugo A. Hopenhayn University of Rochester SBR-9514717 This research will examine several aspects of unemployment insurance that have implications for the design of social insurance in many other countries. The P.I. will undertake joint research with Dr. Antonio Cabrales of Spain and Dr. Juan Pablo Nicolini of Argentina to understand the international dimension of his research project. The first aspect investigated will be the adverse impact of unemployment insurance on the reemployment of workers. Unemployment insurance can induce workers to reduce their search intensity or to decline some job offers. The research will attempt to determine the optimal design of unemployment insurance to provide insurance yet still provide suitable incentives for reemployment. The second aspect will be the ability to learn about different workers abilities over their work history. Unemployment insurance will transfer income from high to low ability workers over time. This will have an impact on the optimal design of unemployment insurance. The final aspect of the research will look at the job creation and job destruction process to learn if this too should affect the optimal design of unemployment insurance, and if so, in what way.

这项研究将考察失业保险的几个方面，这些方面对许多其他国家的社会保险设计具有借鉴意义。P.I.将与西班牙的安东尼奥·卡布拉莱斯博士和阿根廷的胡安·巴勃罗·尼古利尼博士进行联合研究，以了解他的研究项目的国际层面。调查的第一个方面是失业保险对工人再就业的不利影响。失业保险可以诱使工人降低他们的求职强度或拒绝一些工作机会。本研究将试图确定失业保险的最优设计，在提供保险的同时仍能为再就业提供适当的激励。第二个方面是通过员工的工作历史了解不同员工的能力。随着时间的推移，失业保险将把收入从高技能劳动者转移到低能力劳动者。这将对失业保险的优化设计产生影响。研究的最后一个方面将着眼于创造就业和破坏就业的过程，以了解这是否也应该影响失业保险的最佳设计，如果应该，以何种方式。