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Cryptographic Mechanisms for Internet Security

Cryptographic Mechanisms for Internet Security
互联网安全的加密机制
批准号:
0129617
负责人:
Mihir Bellare
金额:
$21.86万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2002
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2002-03-01 至 2006-02-28

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中文摘要
翻译
互联网为新的可能性打开了大门,但也带来了新的风险。互联网安全是一个跨越数学、系统和社会学的广泛公认的问题,灵丹妙药是不可能的。本提案的目标是隔离和针对安全问题的一些组成部分,这些组成部分在实践中对互联网安全有实际影响,并且定义足够明确,以便在项目的时间框架和资源范围内取得清晰,记录和可识别的进展。所选择的问题涉及当前和未来互联网安全协议和标准的加密组件,在技术领域,如身份验证,访问控制,隐私,密钥分发和密钥泄露,以及弥合密码学和系统安全之间的差距。提供高质量、低成本的加密机制,并将它们安全地捆绑在一起,是一项挑战。加密方案很容易指定,但很难验证,并且因包含需要很长时间才能发现的错误而臭名昭著。本提案将采用面向实践的可证明安全方法来改进加密机制的安全保证。这种方法由Bellare和Rogaway开发,在提供由理论保证支持的实用密码学方面已经有了记录。该方法过去的成功案例包括hmac和doaep算法,这些算法已被许多标准机构采用并广泛实施。我们建议解决的前两个问题与协议(如SSL)的安全性有关。研究人员建议研究一种常用但在理论上没有分析过的机制的安全性,即对非对称加密和数字签名使用相同的密钥。研究人员将试图确定在什么情况下这是安全的,并特别关注现有的标准。然后,研究人员将建议调查会话密钥交换协议的安全性,这是SSL、TLS或3GPP等安全协议的核心,建立在会话密钥交换可证明安全性的过去工作的基础上。研究人员可能希望从某些加密机制中获得的对安全性的最大威胁可能只是密钥暴露:入侵者闯入系统并危及底层密钥。这个问题跨越了安全与密码学的边界,接下来研究者提出的两个问题将考虑两种密码学方法来解决它。第一种是前向安全,其目标不是防止密钥暴露,而是通过确保密钥的过去使用不会因其暴露而受到损害,从而减轻其造成的损害。研究人员提出了两个与转发安全相关的具体研究,一个在签名领域,另一个在伪随机数生成领域。第二个问题与人类可记忆的密钥或密码有关。这样做的优点是不会因入侵而暴露密钥,但也有其他缺点,最明显的是容易受到字典攻击。一些公司已经提出了某种形式的服务器辅助的、基于密码的身份验证。研究人员为此目的研究了一些潜在机制的安全性。
英文摘要
The Internet has opened the door to new possibilities, but also brought with it new risks.Internet security is a widely recognized problem crossing the boundaries between mathematics,systems and sociology, and panaceas are unlikely. The goal of this proposal is to isolate andtarget a few components of the security problem that have real impact on Internet security inpractice and are well-defined enough that clear, documented, and identifiable progress can be madewithin the time-frame and resources of the project. The chosen problems relate to cryptographiccomponents of current and future Internet security protocols and standards, in technical areas suchas authentication, access control, privacy, key distribution and key compromise, and to bridgingthe gap between cryptography and systems security. Providing high-quality, cost-efective cryptographic mechanisms, and tying them together se-curely,is a challenge. Cryptographic schemes are easy to specify but hard to validate, and notoriousfor containing bugs that take a long time to be discovered. This proposal will employ the practice-oriented provable-security approach toimprove security guarantees of cryptographic mechansisms.Developed by Bellare and Rogaway, this approach already has a track record in delivering prac-tical cryptography backed by theoretical guarantees. Past successes of this method include theHMAC andOAEP algorithms which have been adopted by numerous standards bodies and widelyimplemented. The first two problems that we propose to address are related to the security of protocolssuch as SSL. The researchers propose to investigate the security ofa mechanism that is common practice butnot analyzed in theory, namely to use the same key for both asymmetric encryption and digitalsignatures. The researchers will seek to determine under what circumstances this is secure, with particularfocus on existing standards. The researchers will then propose to investigate the security of the session key exchange protocols at the heart of security protocols like SSL, TLS or that of 3GPP, building on pastwork in provable security for session key exchange. The greatest threat to the security the researcher may hope to obtain from some cryptographic mechanismmay simply be key exposure: an intruder breaks into the system and compromises the underlyingkey. This problem crosses the boundary between security and cryptography, and the next twoproblems proposed by the researcheris to consider two cryptographic approaches to it. The first is forward-security, whose goal is not to prevent key exposure, but to mitigate the damage it causes by making sure that past uses of a key are not compromised by its exposure. The researchers propose two specific pieces of research related to forward security, one in the domain of signatures and the other in the domainof pseudorandom number generation. The second problem relates to human-memorizable keys, orpasswords. These have the advantage of not being subject to key exposure via breakin, but haveother disadvantages, most notably being subject to dictionary attack. Several corporations haveproposed some form of server-aided, password-based authentication. The researcher looks into the security of some of the potential mechanisms to this end.
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SaTC: CORE: Small: Practice-Driven Cryptographic Theory
  • 批准号:
    2154272
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $50.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2022
  • 负责人:
    Mihir Bellare
  • 依托单位:
SaTC: CORE: Small: Foundations of Applied Cryptography
  • 批准号:
    1717640
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $32.65万
  • 财政年份:
    2017
  • 负责人:
    Mihir Bellare
  • 依托单位:
TWC: Small: Subversion-Resistant Cryptography
  • 批准号:
    1526801
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $50.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2015
  • 负责人:
    Mihir Bellare
  • 依托单位:
TWC: Medium: Collaborative: Deconstructing Encryption
  • 批准号:
    1228890
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $40.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2012
  • 负责人:
    Mihir Bellare
  • 依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Exploring the Intrinsic Mechanisms of CEO Turnover and Market
  • 批准号:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    外国学者研究基金
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 批准年份:
    2024
  • 负责人:
    HAOFEI Z
  • 依托单位:
Exploring the Intrinsic Mechanisms of CEO Turnover and Market Reaction: An Explanation Based on Information Asymmetry
  • 批准号:
    W2433169
  • 项目类别:
    外国学者研究基金项目
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 批准年份:
    2024
  • 负责人:
    HAOFEI ZHANG
  • 依托单位: